Chapter IV/1
The World as Percept
第四章／一
作为感知的世界
Through thinking, concepts and ideas arise. What a concept is cannot be expressed in words. Words can do no more than draw our attention to the fact that we have concepts.
通过思维，概念与观念得以产生。概念究竟是什么，并不能用语言加以说明；语言所能做的，只是提醒人：他自身拥有概念。
When someone sees a tree, their thinking reacts to their observation, an ideal element is added to the object, and they consider the object and the ideal counterpart as belonging together. When the object disappears from their field of observation, only the ideal counterpart of it remains. This latter is the concept of the object.
当一个人看到一棵树时，他的思维便对这一观察作出回应：在对象之外，加入了一个观念性的对应物；于是，他把对象与这一观念性的对应物视为彼此相关的整体。当该对象从他的观察范围中消失时，所留下的便只有这一观念性的对应物。后者，便是该对象的概念。
The broader our range of experience, the greater becomes the sum of our concepts. However, concepts never stand isolated from one another. They combine to form a systematically ordered whole.
我们的经验愈是扩展，概念的总量也就愈加丰富。然而，这些概念绝非孤立存在；它们彼此联结，构成一个遵循内在规律的整体。
In this way all the distinct concepts combine to form a unified conceptual system in which each has its special place. Ideas do not differ qualitatively from concepts. They are simply fuller, more saturated, more comprehensive concepts.
由此，诸个别概念彼此联结，形成一个封闭而自洽的概念体系，在其中，每一个概念都占据其特定的位置。理念在性质上并不不同于概念；它们只是内容更为充实、更为饱和、范围也更为广阔的概念。
I want to stress the importance here of keeping in mind, that I make thinking my starting point, and not concepts and ideas which are first gained by means of thinking. For these latter already presuppose thinking.
在此我必须特别强调一点：在这里应当注意，我所选取的出发点是“思维”，而并非那些唯有通过思维才获得的概念与理 念。后者本身已经预设了思维的存在。
Concepts cannot be acquired from observation. This follows from the simple fact that the growing human being only slowly and gradually forms the concepts corresponding to the objects which surround him. Concepts are added to observation.
概念并不能从观察中直接获得。仅从这样一个事实便已可以看出：成长中的人，是在一个缓慢而渐进的过程中，才逐步为周围的对象形成相应的概念。概念并非源自观察，而是被添加到观察之中的
These concepts, cause and effect, however, I can never gain through mere observation, regardless of how many observations I make. Observation evokes thinking, and it is thinking that first shows me how to link one discrete impression to another.
然而，诸如“原因”与“结果”这样的概念，我绝不可能仅凭观察来获得，即便这种观察扩展到再多的个别情形亦然。观察只是向思维提出挑战；唯有思维本身，才为我指引道路，使我能够把一个个别经验同另一个经验联结起来。
If one demands of a 'strictly objective science' that it should take its content from observation alone, then one must at the same time demand that it should forego all thinking. For thinking, by its very nature, goes beyond what is observed.
如果人们要求一门“严格客观的科学”只能从观察中汲取其内容，那么也就必须同时要求它放弃一切思维；因为就其本性而言，思维总是超出被观察之物。
We must now pass from thinking to the being that thinks; for it is through the thinker that thinking is combined with observation.
现在正当其时，应当从思维转向思维着的存在者；因为正是通过这一存在者，思维才与观察被联结在一起。
Human consciousness is the stage upon which concept and observation meet and become linked to one another. In saying this we have in fact characterised this (human) consciousness. It is the mediator between thinking and observation.
人的意识乃是概念与观察彼此相遇、并在其中相互联结的场所。正因如此，这一（人的）意识也同时获得了其规定性：它是思维与观察之间的中介。
In as far as we observe a thing it appears to us as given; in as far as we think, we appear to ourselves as being active. We regard the thing as object and ourselves as thinking subject. It is because we direct our thinking upon our observation that we have consciousness of objects, and because we direct it upon ourselves, we have consciousness of ourselves, or self-consciousness.
就人对对象加以观察而言，该对象向他呈现为既定之物；就人进行思维而言，他则把自身体验为能动的存在。他将对象视为客体，而将自身视为思维着的主体。由于他把自己的思维指向观察，他便具有对对象的意识；由于他把自己的思维指向自身，他便具有对自身的意识，亦即自我意识。
Human consciousness must of necessity be at the same time self-consciousness because it is a consciousness which thinks. For when thinking contemplates its own activity, it makes its own essential being, namely its subject, into a thing, as its object.
人的意识必然同时也是自我意识，因为它是思维的意识。因为当思维把目光转向自身的活动时，它便将其最本己的本质——亦即它的主体——作为对象来把握。
It must, however, not be overlooked that only with the help of thinking am I able to determine myself as subject and contrast myself with objects. Therefore thinking must never be regarded as a merely subjective activity.
然而，不可忽视的是：唯有借助思维，我们才能将自身规定为主体，并使自己与对象相对而立。因此，思维绝不可被理解为一种纯然主观的活动。
Thinking exists beyond subject and object. It forms these two concepts just as it forms all others.
思维位于主体与客体之外；它生成这两个概念，正如生成一切其他概念一样。
When, therefore, as thinking subject, I relate a concept to an object, we must not regard this relation as something purely subjective. It is not the subject that makes the relation, but thinking.
因此，当我们作为思维着的主体把概念指向某一对象时，绝不可将这种关系理解为某种纯然主观的东西。促成这种关系的，并非主体本身，而是思维。
The subject does not think because it is a subject; rather it appears to itself as subject because it is able to think.
主体并非因为它是主体才进行思维；恰恰相反，它之所以向自身呈现为主体，乃是因为它具有思维的能力。
The activity exercised by the human being as a thinking being is thus not merely subjective. Rather is it something neither subjective nor objective, that transcends both these concepts.
因此，人作为思维着的存在者所从事的这种活动，并非一种纯然主观的活动，而是一种既非主观亦非客观、而是超出这两种概念之上的活动。
It is not correct to say that my individual subject thinks, but rather that my individual subject exists by the grace of thinking.
我绝不可说是我的个体主体在思维；恰恰相反，这一个体主体本身，乃是凭借思维之恩而得以存在。
Thinking is thus an element which leads me out beyond myself and connects me with the world of objects. But at the same time it separates me from them, inasmuch as it sets me, as subject, over against them.
因此，思维乃是一种要素：它将我引出自身之外，使我与对象相连；但与此同时，它又把我与对象区分开来，因为正是通过思维，我被置于与对象相对的主体位置之上。
It is precisely this which constitutes the double nature of the human being. They think, and thereby embrace both themself and the rest of the world. But at the same time it is by means of thinking that they determine themself as an individual standing apart from the world of things.
正是在此基础之上，人的双重本性得以成立：他进行思维，并由此将自身与其余世界一并包容其中；然而，他又必须借助思维，同时将自身规定为一个与诸事物相对而立的个体。
