Chapter IV/2
The World as Percept
第四章/2
作为感知的世界
We must next ask ourselves how that other element, which we have so far simply called the object of observation and which meets the thinking in our consciousness, comes into our consciousness at all.
接下来，我们要探问的是：我们迄今仅仅称之为“观察对象”的那一要素——它在意识中与思维相遇——究竟是如何进入意识之中的？
In order to answer this question we must eliminate from our field of observation everything that has been imported by thinking. For at any moment the content of our consciousness will already be interwoven with concepts in the most varied ways.
为了回答这一问题，我们必须从我们的观察领域中剔除一切已经由思维带入其中的成分。因为我们当下的意识内容，总是已经以种种方式被概念所渗透。
We must imagine that a being with fully developed human intelligence originates out of nothing and confronts the world. What it would be aware of, before it sets its thinking in motion, would be the pure content of observation.
我们必须设想：有一个具有充分发展之人类理智的存在者，自无中产生，并与世界相对而立。在尚未使思维付诸活动之前，它所觉察到的一切，便是纯粹的观察内容。
This aggregate is the content of pure, unthinking observation. Over against it stands thinking, ready to begin its activity as soon as a point of attack presents itself. Experience shows at once that this does happen.
这个聚合体，便是纯粹而无思的观察之内容。与之相对的，是那随时准备展开其活动的思维，只要为其找到一个着力点。经验很快便教会我们：这样的着力点确实能够找到。
Thinking is able to draw threads from one element of observation to another. It links definite concepts with these elements and thereby establishes a relationship between them.
思维能够从一个观察要素引出线索，通向另一个观察要素。它将特定的概念与这些要素联结起来，并由此使它们进入某种关系之中。
If now we recollect that the activity of thinking is on no account to be considered as merely subjective, then we shall also not be tempted to believe that the relationships thus established by thinking have merely subjective validity.
如果我们此刻还记得，思维的活动绝不能被理解为一种主观的活动，那么我们也就不会倾向于相信：那些由思维所建立的关系，仅仅具有主观的效力。
Our next task is to discover by means of thoughtful reflection what relation the immediately given content of observation mentioned above has to the conscious subject.
接下来，我们要通过思维的反省，去探寻那一在上文所指出的、直接给予的观察内容，与我们的意识主体之间所具有的关系。
I shall apply the word 'percept' to the immediate objects of sensation enumerated above, in so far as the conscious subject apprehends them through observation. It is, then, not the process of observation but the object of observation which I call the 'percept'.
我将把我在上文所提到的那些直接的感性对象，在意识主体通过观察而获得对其认识的意义上，称为“知觉”。因此，我用这一名称所指的，并不是观察这一过程本身，而是该观察的对象。
I can speak of a feeling in myself (emotion) as percept, but not as sensation in the physiological sense of the term. Even my feeling becomes known to me by becoming a percept for me. And the way in which we gain knowledge of our thinking through observation is such that thinking too, in its first appearance for our consciousness, may be called a percept.
我内在的一个情感，固然可以被称为“知觉”，但却不能被称为生理学意义上的“感觉”。因为我之所以获得对自己情感的认识，正是由于它对我而言成为一种知觉。而我们通过观察而获得对自身思维的认识，其方式亦是如此；因此，我们也可以把思维在其首次进入我们意识之时，称为“知觉”。
Every extension of the circle of my percepts compels me to correct my picture of the world. We see this in everyday life, as well as in the spiritual development of mankind.
我的知觉范围每一次扩展，都迫使我修正自己关于世界的图像。这一点，无论在日常生活中，还是在人类精神的发展历程中，都同样显而易见。
My percept-picture changes when I change the place from which I am looking. Therefore the form in which it presents itself to me is dependent on a condition which is due not to the object but to me, the perceiver.
当我改变进行观察的立足之处时，我的知觉图像也随之改变。因此，它以何种形态向我呈现，并非单纯取决于对象本身，而是依赖于一种并不附着于对象、而是属于我——这一知觉者——的规定。
This dependence of our percept-picture on our place of observation is the easiest one to understand. The matter becomes more difficult when we realize how our world of percepts is dependent on our bodily and spiritual organization.
知觉图像对我们观察位置的这种依赖，是最容易看清的一种依赖。然而，当我们进一步认识到，我们的知觉世界还依赖于我们的身体组织与精神结构时，事情便已变得更为复杂。
I should like to call the dependence of my percept-picture on my place of observation, 'mathematical', and its dependence on my organisation, 'qualitative'. The former determines the proportions of size and mutual distances of my percepts, the latter their quality.
我愿意把我的知觉图像对观察位置的依赖称为一种“数学的”依赖，而把它对我的组织的依赖称为一种“质性的”依赖。前一种依赖决定我的诸知觉之间的大小关系与相互距离；后一种则决定这些知觉的性质。
The fact that I see a red surface as red - this qualitative determination - depends on the organisation of my eye.
我之所以把一个红色的平面看作红色——这种质性的规定——乃是依赖于我眼睛的组织。
My percept-pictures, then, are in the first instance subjective. The recognition of the subjective character of our percepts may easily lead us to doubt whether there is any objective basis for them at all.
因此，我的知觉图像首先具有主观性。对于我们的知觉之主观性质的认识，很容易引发这样一种怀疑：是否根本不存在任何客观的东西，作为这些知觉的根据。
The matter would appear very different if we were in a position to say just what part is played by our perceiving in the bringing forth of a percept. We should then know what happens to a percept while it is being perceived, and we should also be able to determine what character it must already possess before it comes to be perceived.
然而，如果我们能够指出，在一个知觉形成之际，我们的知觉活动所起的功能究竟是什么，那么事情便会呈现出一种本质上不同的面貌。那时，我们便会知道，在知觉的过程中究竟发生了什么；并且也能够判定，在它被知觉之前，其中必须已经具备些什么。
This leads us to turn our attention from the object of perception to the subject of perception. I perceive not only other things, but also myself.
由此，我们的考察便从知觉的对象转向了知觉的主体。我不仅知觉到其他事物，而且也知觉到我自身。
The percept of myself contains, to begin with, the fact that I am the stable element in contrast to the continual coming and going of the percept-pictures.
对我自身的知觉，首先包含这样一种内容：在那不断来去的知觉图像面前，我是那保持恒常者。
The percept of my 'I' can always come up in my consciousness while I am having other percepts. When I am absorbed in the perception of a given object I am for the time being aware only of this object. To this the percept of my self can be added.
对“我”的知觉，始终可以在我的意识中出现，即便当我具有其他知觉之时亦然。当我沉浸于某一给定对象的知觉之中时，我暂时只对这一对象具有意识。随后，对我自身的知觉便可以加入进来。
I am then conscious not only of the object but also of my own personality which confronts the object and observes it. I do not merely see a tree, but I also know that it is I who am seeing it. I know, moreover, that something happens in me while I am observing the tree.
此时，我不仅意识到对象，而且也意识到我自身的个体性——这一与对象相对而立、并对其进行观察的个体。我不仅看见一棵树，而且也知道，是我在看它。我还意识到，在我观察这棵树之时，我之中有某种活动在进行。
When the tree disappears from my field of vision, an after-effect of this process remains in my consciousness -- a picture of the tree.
This picture has become associated with my self during my observation. My self has become enriched; its content has absorbed a new element. This element I call my mental picture of the tree.
当那棵树从我的视域中消失时，在我的意识中便留下了这一过程的一个残余：一个树的图像。这个图像在我进行观察之时，已与我的自我结合。我的自我因此得到了丰富；它的内容吸收了一个新的要素。这个要素，我称之为我关于这棵树的“表象”。
I should never have occasion to speak of mental pictures did I not experience them in the percept of my own self. Percepts would come and go; I should let them slip by.
如果我不是在对自身的知觉中体验到表象，我便永远不会处于能够谈论表象的境地。知觉将只是来去流动；我会任由它们从我面前掠过。
Only because I perceive my self, and observe that with each percept the content of my self, too, is changed, am I compelled to connect the observation of the object with the changes in my own condition, and to speak of my mental picture.
正是由于我知觉到我的自我，并且注意到，随着每一次知觉，自我的内容也随之发生变化，我才感到有必要把对对象的观察同我自身状态的改变联系起来，并进而谈论我的“表象”。
