Chapter 7.2 – Philosophy of Freedom

Chapter VII/2

Are there Limits to Knowledge?

第七章／2

认知是否有其界限？

The naive man (naive realist) regards the objects of external experience as realities.

朴素之人（朴素实在论者）将外部经验的对象视为实在。

In contrast with this real world of his, the naive realist regards everything else, especially the world of ideas, as unreal or 'merely ideal'. What we add to objects by thinking is nothing more than thoughts about the things. Thought adds nothing real to the percept.

相对于他的实在世界，对朴素实在论者来说，其他一切——尤其是理念世界——都是非实在的、"仅属理念的"。我们附加于事物之上的思考，不过是关于事物的纯粹思想。思想不给感知添加任何实在的东西。

But it is not only with reference to the existence of things that the naive man regards sense perception as the sole proof of reality, but also with reference to events. A thing, according to him, can act on another only when a force actually present to sense perception issues from the one and seizes upon the other.

然而朴素之人不仅在事物的存在方面将感官感知视为实在性的唯一见证，在事件的发生方面也如此。在他看来，一个事物只有当一种可被感官感知的力量从它出发、并作用于另一事物时，才能对另一事物产生影响。

In this need of the naive man lies the original ground for primitive forms of the belief in revelation. (...) God must appear in the flesh, and little value is attached to the testimony of thinking, but only to proof of divinity such as changing water into wine in a way that can be testified by the senses.

正是在朴素之人的这种需求中，蕴藏着原始启示信仰形式得以产生的根源。（……）上帝必须以肉身显现，人们不愿轻信思维的见证，只在乎神性是否通过感官可察知的奇迹——如将水变为酒——得到证明。

Even the act of knowing itself is pictured by the naive man as a process analogous to sense perception. Things, it is thought, make an impression on the soul, or send out images which enter through our senses, and so on.

朴素之人同样将认知本身想象为一个类似于感官过程的程序。事物在灵魂中留下印象，或发射出通过感官进入其中的图像，如此等等。

A science based on naive realism would have to be nothing but an exact description of the content of perception. For naive realism, concepts are only the means to an end. They exist to provide ideal counterparts of percepts, and have no significance for the things themselves.

若朴素实在论意欲建立一门科学，它只能将科学理解为对感知内容的精确描述。概念对它来说只是达到目的的手段。它们的存在是为了为感知创造理念上的对应镜像。对于事物本身，概念毫无意义。

For the naive realist, only the individual tulips which he sees (or could see) are real; the single idea of the tulip is to him an abstraction, the unreal thought-picture which the soul has put together out of the characteristics common to all tulips.

对朴素实在论者来说，只有那些被看见或可被看见的个别郁金香才是实在的；郁金香这一理念对他来说不过是一个抽象物，一个灵魂从所有郁金香共同特征中拼凑起来的非实在的思想图像。

Naive realism, with its fundamental principle of the reality of all perceived things, is contradicted by experience, which teaches us that the content of percepts is of a transitory nature. (...) What persists is the species tulip. For the naive realist, however, this species is merely an idea, not a reality.

朴素实在论及其"一切被感知之物皆为实在"的基本原则，被经验所驳倒——经验告诉我们感知内容是转瞬即逝的。（……）唯一持存下来的，是"郁金香"这一类。然而对朴素实在论而言，这一类"只不过"是一个理念，并非实在。

Thus this world view finds itself in the position of seeing its realities arise and perish, while what it regards as unreal, in contrast with the real, persists. Hence naive realism is compelled to acknowledge, in addition to percepts, the existence of something ideal. It must admit entities which cannot be perceived by the senses.

于是，这一世界观发现自己处于这样的境地：眼睁睁看着它所认定的实在之物来了又去，而它认为非实在的东西却在实在之物面前站稳了脚跟。因此，朴素实在论除了感知之外，也不得不承认某种理念性的东西。它必须容纳那些无法用感官感知的本质。

Just such hypothetical realities are the invisible forces by means of which the sense-perceptible objects act on one another. One such thing is heredity, which works on beyond the individual and is the reason why a new individual resembles its parent, thereby serving to maintain the species.

这类被假设性承认的实在，包括那些不可见的力量——通过它们，可由感官感知的事物彼此作用。遗传便是这样一种东西：它的作用延续至个体之外，并因此使得一个与原个体相似的新个体从中发展出来，从而维系了物种的延续。

It is the same with the life-principle permeating the organic body, the soul for which the naive mind always finds a concept formed in analogy with sense realities, and finally the naive man's Divine Being. This Divine Being is thought of as acting in a manner exactly corresponding to the way in which man himself is seen to act; that is, anthropomorphically.

这样的东西还有贯穿有机躯体的生命原则、灵魂——在朴素意识中人们总是以感官实在的类比来形成关于灵魂的概念——以及最终，朴素之人所信奉的神圣本质。这一神圣本质被设想为以某种完全对应于人自身可被感知的行动方式来发挥作用：即拟人化的方式。

For example, what we experience as warmth is, within the space occupied by the warmth-giving body, the movement of its parts. Here again something imperceptible is conceived in analogy with what is perceptible.

例如，我们所感受到的热，在产生热的物体所占据的空间内，不过是其各部分的运动。在这里，不可感知之物又一次被按照可感知之物的类比来设想。

It is clear, however, that naive realism can only make these assumptions by being inconsistent. (...) And because naive realism knows no other realities, it invests its hypothetical forces with perceptual content. It thus ascribes a form of existence (perceptible existence) to a sphere where the only means of making any assertion about such existence, namely, sense perception, is lacking.

然而显而易见，朴素实在论只能通过一种前后矛盾才能得出这一假设。（……）因为它不认识任何其他实在，所以它用感知内容来装备其假设性的力量。由此，它将一种存在形式（感知性存在）运用于这样一个领域——在那里，它缺乏唯一有权就这种存在形式作出判断的手段：感官感知。

This self-contradictory theory leads to metaphysical realism. This constructs, in addition to the perceptible reality, an imperceptible reality which it conceives analogous to the perceptible one. Therefore metaphysical realism is of necessity dualistic.

这一内在自相矛盾的世界观通向了形而上学实在论。后者在可感知的实在之外还构建了一个不可感知的实在，并将其按照前者的类比来设想。因此，形而上学实在论必然是二元论。

Wherever the metaphysical realist observes a relationship between perceptible things (such as when two things move towards each other, or when something objective enters consciousness), there he sees a reality. However, the relationship which he notices can only be expressed by means of thinking; it cannot be perceived. The purely ideal relationship is then arbitrarily made into something similar to a perceptible one.

凡形而上学实在论察觉到可感知事物之间的某种关系（通过运动而趋近、某种客观之物进入意识，等等），它便在那里设置一个实在。然而，它所察觉到的关系，它只能通过思维来表达，而无法感知到。这一理念性的关系被随意地转化为某种类似于可感知之物的东西。

If we are to avoid the contradiction of imperceptible percepts, we must admit that the relationships which thinking establishes between the percepts can have no other mode of existence for us than that of concepts.

若要避免"不可感知的感知"这一矛盾，就必须承认：对于那些由思维所中介的感知之间的关系，对我们来说不存在任何其他的存在形式，唯有概念的形式。

Let us call the view which we have characterized above, into which metaphysical realism merges when it discards its contradictory elements, monism, because it combines one-sided realism with idealism into a higher unity.

我们想将上述所描述的世界观——形而上学实在论在去除其自相矛盾的要素后最终汇入的那个世界观——称为一元论，因为它将片面的实在论与唯心论统一于一个更高的整体。

For naive realism, the real world is an aggregate of perceived objects (percepts); for metaphysical realism, not only percepts but also imperceptible forces are real; monism replaces forces by ideal connections which are gained through thinking. The laws of nature are just such connections.

对朴素实在论而言，真实世界是感知对象的总和；对形而上学实在论而言，除感知之外，不可感知的力量也具有实在性；一元论则以通过思维所获得的理念联系取代力量的位置。而这样的联系，便是自然规律。

Monism never finds it necessary to ask for any principles of explanation for reality other than percepts and concepts. It knows that in the whole field of reality there is no occasion for this question. In the perceptual world, as it presents itself directly to perception, it sees one half of the reality; in the union of this world with the world of concepts it finds the full reality.

一元论根本不会去寻求感知与概念以外的其他现实解释原则。它知道，在整个现实领域之内不存在任何理由这样做。它在感知世界——如其直接向感知所呈现的那样——中看到半个现实；在感知世界与概念世界的统一中，它发现完整的现实。

Through my perceiving, that is, through this specifically human mode of perceiving, I, as subject, am confronted with the object. The connection of things is thereby interrupted. The subject restores this connection by means of thinking. In doing so it puts itself back into the context of the world unity.

通过我的感知——这种特定的人类感知——我作为主体被置于与客体相对的位置。由此，事物之间的关联被切断了。主体通过思维重新恢复了这一关联。由此，它将自身重新嵌入了世界整体。

For these theories, what exists outside the subject is something absolute, founded in itself, and what is contained within the subject is a picture of this absolute, but quite external to it. The completeness of knowledge depends on the greater or lesser degree of resemblance between the picture and the absolute object.

对它们来说，主体之外的存在是一种绝对物，一种自我依存之物，而主体的内容则是它的映像——这一映像完全置身于这一绝对物之外。认知的完善程度取决于映像与绝对客体之间相似程度的高低。

Whatever senses man might possibly have, not one of them would give him reality if whatever he perceived by means of it were not permeated by his thinking with concepts. And every sense, however constructed, would, if thus permeated, enable him to live within reality.

无论人还可能拥有哪种感官：若不以思维将通过它所中介的被感知之物贯穿以概念，没有一种感官能给予他现实；而每一种任何性质的感官，一旦被如此贯穿，便给予人生活在现实之中的可能性。

We must clearly understand that every perceptual picture of the world owes its form to the organisation of the perceiving being, but also that the perceptual picture which has been thoroughly permeated by the experience of thinking leads us into reality.

人必须认识到：每一个感知图像都从感知者的有机组织中获得其形态；然而被亲历的思维性观照所贯穿的感知图像，则将人引入现实之中。

The deepening of knowledge depends on the powers of intuition which express themselves in thinking. In the living experience which develops within thinking, this intuition may dive down to greater or to lesser depths of reality.

认知的深化，取决于那些在思维中展开自身的直觉力量。这种直觉，能够在思维所展开的体验中，潜入现实或深或浅的底层。

But we should never confuse this diving into the depths to reach reality with being exposed to a perceptual picture of greater or lesser breadth, which in any case can only contain half the reality, as determined by the organisation of the cognising being.

然而，这种潜入深处——作为抵达现实——绝不应与面对更宽广或更狭窄的感知图像混为一谈；在那样的感知图像中，始终呈现的只是半个现实——那种由认知性有机组织所限定的现实。