Chapter VII/1
Are there Limits to Knowledge?
第七章／1
认知是否有其界限？
We have established that the elements for the explanation of reality are to be found in the two spheres: perceiving and thinking.
我们已经确立：解释现实的要素来自两个领域——感知与思维。
It is due, as we have seen, to our organisation that the full, complete reality, including our own selves as subjects, appears at first as a duality. The act of knowing overcomes this duality by fusing the two elements of reality, the percept and the concept gained by thinking, into the complete thing.
如我们所见，我们的有机组织使然：完整的、全部的现实——包括我们自身的主体——最初向我们呈现为一种二元性。认知克服了这种二元性，它从现实的两个要素——感知与通过思维所获得的概念——将事物整合为一个整体。
Let us call the manner in which the world presents itself to us, before it has taken on its true nature through cognition, 'the world of appearance', in contrast to the unified whole composed of percept and concept. We can then say: The world is given to us as a duality, and the act of knowing transforms it into a unity.
让我们把世界在认知赋予其正当形态之前向我们呈现的那种方式，称为"现象世界"——以区别于由感知与概念统一组成的本质。如此我们便可以说：世界以二元（二元论）的形式被给予我们，而认知将其加工为统一（一元论）。
A philosophy which starts from this basic principle may be called a monistic philosophy, or monism. Opposed to this is the two-world theory, or dualism. The latter does not assume just that there are two sides of a single reality which are kept apart merely by our organisation, but that there are two worlds absolutely distinct from one another. It then tries to find in one of these two worlds the principles for the explanation of the other.
以这一基本原则为出发点的哲学，可以称为一元论哲学或一元论。与之相对的是"两个世界的理论"，或称二元论。后者所设定的，并非仅仅由我们的有机组织所区隔开来的统一现实的两个面向，而是两个彼此绝对不同的世界。它随后在一个世界中为另一个世界寻求解释原则。
It is from a dualism such as this that there arises the distinction between the perceptual object and the 'thing-in-itself', which Kant introduced into philosophy, and which, to the present day, we have not succeeded in eradicating.
正是从这样一种二元论中，产生了康德引入科学、迄今尚未被消除的那一区分——感知对象与"物自体"之间的区分。
According to our line of argument, it is due to the nature of the human mind that a particular thing can be given to us only as a percept. Thinking then overcomes this particularity by assigning to each percept its rightful place in the world as a whole.
依据我们的阐述，一个特殊的事物只能以感知的形式被给予——这是我们精神组织本性之所在。思维随后克服了这种特殊性，为每一感知在世界整体中指定其合乎规律的位置。
If, however, we regard the sum of all percepts as the one part, and contrast with this a second part, namely, the 'things-in-themselves', then we are engaging in pure speculation devoid of any firm foundation. We are merely playing with concepts. We construct an artificial pair of opposites, but we can gain no content for the second of these opposites, since such content for a particular thing can be drawn only from perception.
然而，若我们将所有感知的总和视为一方，并在"物自体"中为其树立另一方，那我们便是在虚空中哲学化。这时我们所从事的不过是一种纯粹的概念游戏。我们构建了一个人为的对立，却无法为其第二项获取任何内容——因为对于任何特殊事物，这样的内容只能从感知中汲取。
Every kind of existence that is assumed outside the realm of percept and concept must be relegated to the sphere of unjustified hypotheses. To this category belongs the 'thing-in-itself'.
一切被设定于感知与概念领域之外的存在方式，都应归入无根据假设的范畴。"物自体"正属于此类。
A content for the hypothetical world principle can be arrived at only by borrowing it from the world of experience and then shutting one's eyes to the fact of the borrowing. Otherwise it remains an empty concept, a non-concept which has nothing but the form of a concept.
对于那个假设性的世界原则，只有借助于从经验世界中借取的内容——同时掩盖这一事实——才能获得某种内容。否则它只是一个空洞的概念，一个仅具概念形式的"非概念"。
Here the dualistic thinker usually asserts that the content of this concept is inaccessible to our knowledge; we can know only that such a content exists, but not what it is that exists. In both cases it is impossible to overcome dualism.
二元论思想家通常声称：这一概念的内容对我们的认知是不可及的；我们只能知道有某种内容存在，却不能知道存在的是什么。在这两种情形下，超越二元论都是不可能的。
Even if one were to import a few abstract elements from the world of experience into the concept of the thing-in-itself, it would still remain impossible to derive the rich concrete life of experience from these few qualities which are, after all, themselves taken from perception.
即便将几个来自经验世界的抽象要素纳入"物自体"的概念，也始终不可能将经验那丰富而具体的生命归结为几种本身只是从感知中借取的属性。
This conclusion is characteristic of this whole trend of thought. Position and motion are abstracted from the rich world of percepts, They are then transferred to the notional world of atoms. And then astonishment arises that real life cannot be evolved out of this self-made principle borrowed from the world of percepts.
这一推论是这整种思维取向的典型。从丰富的感知世界中，位置与运动被抽离出来，被移植到那个臆造出来的原子世界里。随后便产生了这样的困惑：为何从这个自我构造、又从感知世界中借取来的原则，无法演绎出具体的生命。
The follower of a monistic world conception knows that everything he needs for the explanation of any given phenomenon in the world must lie within this world itself. What prevents him from reaching it can be only accidental limitations in space and time, or defects of his organisation, that is, not of the human organisation in general, but only of his own particular one.
一元论世界观的信奉者知道：他解释世界中任何给定现象所需要的一切，必然存在于现象世界的范围之内。阻碍他达到这一目标的，只能是偶然的时间或空间局限，或是其有机组织的缺陷——而且不是人类有机组织的普遍缺陷，而只是他个人特有的缺陷。
正是由。
It follows from the concept of cognition as we have defined it, that one cannot speak of limits to knowledge. Cognition is not a concern of the world in general, but something which uniquely confronts the human being.
从我们所确定的认知概念中可以推得：不能谈论认知的界限。认知不是一件普遍的世界事务，而是人与自身需要了结的一桩事情。
Things of themselves demand no explanation. They exist and act on one another according to laws which can be discovered through thinking. They exist in indivisible unity with these laws. Our inner self confronts them, grasping at first only that part of them we have called percepts. Within our self however, lies the power to discover the other part of the reality as well.
事物本身并不需要解释。它们存在着，并依循那些可被思维发现的规律彼此作用。它们与这些规律不可分割地融为一体。我们的自我性（Ichheit）此时与事物相对而立，最初只把握到我们所称的"感知"那一部分。然而在这自我性的内部，有一种力量，足以发现现实的另一部分。
Only when the I has taken the two elements of reality which are indivisibly united in the world and has combined them also for itself, is our thirst for knowledge satisfied - the I has then arrived at the reality once more.
唯当自我性也为自身将那两个在世界中不可分割地结合着的现实要素统一起来，认知的满足才得以实现：自我重新抵达了现实。
Thus the conditions necessary for an act of knowledge to take place are there through the I and for the I. The I sets itself the problems of knowledge; and moreover it takes them from an element that is absolutely clear and transparent in itself: the element of thinking.
因此，认知得以产生的前提条件，是通过自我、也为了自我而设立的。自我自行向自身提出认知的问题。而这些问题，它从那个在自身之内完全清晰透明的思维要素中汲取。
In our knowledge we are concerned with questions which arise for us through the fact that a sphere of percepts, conditioned by place, time, and our subjective organisation, is confronted by a sphere of concepts pointing to the totality of the universe. My task consists in reconciling these two spheres, with both of which I am well acquainted.
我们的认知，所涉及的是由以下情形所赋予我们的问题：一个由地点、时间和主观有机组织所限定的感知领域，面对着一个指向世界整体性的概念领域。我的任务在于调和这两个我所熟知的领域。
Dualism makes the mistake of transferring the antithesis of object and subject, which has meaning only within the perceptual realm, to purely notional entities outside this realm.
二元论所犯的错误在于：它将客体与主体的对立——这一对立只在感知领域之内才具有意义——移植到了感知领域以外的纯粹臆造的本质之上。
But since the separate things within the perceptual field remain separated only so long as the perceiver refrains from thinking (which cancels all separation and shows it to be due to purely subjective factors), the dualist is therefore transferring to entities behind the perceptible realm determining factors which even for this realm have no absolute, but only relative validity.
然而，在感知视域之内被分隔开来的事物，其分隔状态只在感知者尚未运用思维时才持续存在——而思维能够消解一切分隔，并使人认识到这种分隔只是主观条件所致。因此，二元论者将一些仅对感知本身具有相对效力（而非绝对效力）的规定，移植到感知背后的那些本质之上。
With this the dualist therefore splits up the process of knowledge into two parts. The one part, namely, the production of the perceptual object out of the 'thing-in-itself', he conceives of as taking place outside consciousness, whereas the other, the combination of percept with concept and the reference of the concept to the object, takes place, according to him, within consciousness.
由此，二元论将认知过程一分为二。其中一部分——从"物自体"中生成感知对象——它让其发生于意识之外；另一部分——将感知与概念相联结、并将概念关联于对象——则让其发生于意识之内。
The objectively real process in the subject by means of which the percept comes about, and still more the objective relations between 'things-in-themselves', remain for such a dualist inaccessible to direct knowledge; according to him, man can obtain only conceptual representatives of the objectively real.
主体内那个使感知得以产生的客观真实过程，以及更甚于此的"物自体"之间的客观关系，对这样一位二元论者而言都是直接不可认知的；在他看来，人只能为客观真实之物获得概念上的代表。
In other words, the ideal principles which thinking discovers seem too ethereal for the dualist, and he seeks, in addition, real principles with which to support them.
换言之：在二元论者看来，那些可由思维发现的理想原则太过空洞轻飘，他还在寻求能够支撑它们的实在原则。
