Chapter IX/4
The Idea of Freedom
第九章/4
自由的理念
But how is a social life possible for human beings if everyone is only striving to assert their own individuality? (...) What this kind of moralism fails to understand is just the unity of the world of ideas. It does not see that the world of ideas working in me is no other than the one working in my fellow human beings. Albeit this unity is but an outcome of practical experience.
然而，如果每个人都只致力于彰显自己的个体性，人与人之间的共同生活如何成为可能？……这种道德主义恰恰不理解理念世界的统一性。它不明白：在我之中起作用的理念世界，与在我的同类中起作用的理念世界，并无二致。当然，这种统一性不过是世界经验的一个结果。
A moral misunderstanding, a clash of wills, is impossible between people who are morally free. Only the morally unfree who follow their natural instincts or the accepted commands of duty come into conflict with their neighbours when these do not obey the same instincts and the same commands as themselves.
在道德上自由的人之间，道德上的误解与冲突是不存在的。只有道德上不自由的人——那跟随自然冲动或接受的义务戒命行事的人——当邻人不遵循同样的本能和同样的戒命时，才会与之产生排斥。
To live in love towards our actions, and to let live in the understanding of the other person's will, is the fundamental maxim of free human beings. They know no other obligation than what is intuitively united with their will. How they are to direct their will in a particular case will be determined on the basis of their capacity for ideas.
在对行动的爱中生活，并在对他人意愿的理解中让他人生活——这是自由人的基本准则。他们所知道的唯一"应当"，是其意愿以直觉方式与之协调一致的那个"应当"；在具体情况中他们将会如何意愿，他们的理念能力会告诉他们。
The free individual lives in confidence that they and any other free individuals belong to one spiritual world, and that their intentions will harmonise. The free individual does not demand agreement from their fellow human beings, but rightly anticipates it because it is inherent in human nature.
自由的人生活在这样的信任之中：另一个自由的人与他同属一个精神世界，并将在意图上与他相遇。自由的人不要求同类与其一致，但他期待这种一致，因为它植根于人类的本性之中。
Which of us can say that they are really free in all their actions? Yet in each of us there dwells a deeper essence in which the free human being comes to expression.
我们中有谁能说，在自己所有的行为中都是真正自由的？然而在我们每个人之中，都居住着一种更深的本质，自由的人正是在其中表达自身的。
Our life is made up of free and unfree actions. We cannot, however, fully think through the idea of the human being without arriving at the free spirit as the purest expression of human nature. Indeed, we are human beings in the true sense only in so far as we are free.
我们的生命由自由的行为与不自由的行为共同构成。然而，我们无法将人的概念思考至终点，而不抵达自由精神——作为人类本性最纯粹的体现。我们真正成为人，唯有在我们自由的限度之内。
Many will say this is simply an ideal. Doubtless; but it is an ideal which is also a real element in us working its way to the surface of our nature. It is not a theoretical or fanciful ideal, but one which has life, and which clearly declares itself even in its most imperfect manifestation.
许多人会说：这是一个理想。毫无疑问，但这是一个在我们的本质中作为真实因素涌向表面的理想。它不是一个被构想出来或被幻想出来的理想，而是一个具有生命的理想，即便在其存在的最不完善的形态中，也清晰地预告着自身。
With the things of the outer world, the concept is determined by the percept; we have contributed our part by recognising the connection between concept and percept.
在外部世界的事物上，理念是通过感知来规定的；当我们认识了理念与感知的关联，我们便完成了自己份内之事。
But with human beings it is not so.
The totality of human existence is not fully determined without the human beings themselves; their true concept as a moral being (free spirit) is not objectively united from the start with the percept-picture 'human being' needing only to be confirmed afterwards by the act of cognition.
对于人来说，情形并非如此。他存在的总和不是撇开他自身被规定的；他作为道德存在（自由精神）的真正概念，并非事先客观地与"人"这一感知图像相联合，以便事后仅由认识加以确认。
As human beings we must unite our concept with the percept of 'human' by our own activity. Concept and percept coincide here only if we ourselves make them coincide. This we can do only if we have found the concept of the free spirit, that is, if we have found the concept of our true self.
人必须自主地将自己的概念与"人"这一感知相联合。概念与感知在此只有当人自己将二者汇合时才能重合。而他只有在找到了自由精神的概念——亦即找到了他自己的概念——时，才能做到这一点。
In the objective world a separation is set up by our organisation between percept and concept; knowledge overcomes this separation. In our subjective nature this separation is no less present; the individual overcomes it in the course of development, bringing the concept of self into expression within outward existence.
在客观世界中，我们的有机组织在感知与概念之间划下了一道界线；认识克服了这道界线。在主观本性中，这道界线同样存在；人在其发展过程中克服它，方式是：在其现象中将自己的概念带向实现。
The intellectual life overcomes this two-fold nature by means of knowledge, the moral life overcomes it through the effective realisation of the free spirit.
理智生命通过认识克服双重本性，道德生命则通过自由精神的实际实现来克服它。
Concept and percept are, at first, effectively separated in the human being, to be just as effectively united by them.
在人自身那里，概念与感知起初实实在在地是分离的，以便由他同样实实在在地加以联合。
The perceptual object 'human being' has in it the possibility of transforming itself, just as the plant seed contains the possibility of becoming a complete plant. The plant transforms itself because of the objective law inherent in it; human beings remain in their incomplete state unless they take hold of the material for transformation within themselves and transforms themselves through their own power.
在"人"这一感知对象中，蕴藏着自我转化的可能性，正如植物的种子中蕴藏着长成整株植物的可能性。植物将因其内在的客观规律性而转化；而人若不在自身中汲取转化的素材、并以自身的力量完成转化，便将停留于其未完成的状态。
Nature makes of the human bing merely a natural being; society makes of them a law-abiding being; only they can make themselves into free human beings
自然使人成为单纯的自然存在；社会使人成为依法行事的存在；自由的存在，他只能自己造就自己。
For the free spirit overcomes the norms in the sense that they do not simply accept commandments as their motives but order their actions according to their own impulses (intuitions).
然而，自由精神超越规范，其意义在于：它不仅仅将戒命感受为动机，而是按照自己的冲动（直觉）来安排自己的行为。
When Kant says of duty: "Duty! Thou exalted and mighty name, thou that dost comprise nothing lovable, nothing ingratiating, but demandest submission," thou that "settest up a law ... before which all inclinations are silent, even though they secretly work against it," then out of the consciousness of the free spirit, the human being replies:
当康德谈到义务时说："义务！你崇高、伟大的名字，你不包含任何带有逢迎之意的可爱东西，而是要求服从"，你"颁布一条法则……一切倾向在它面前都沉默了，哪怕它们暗中与之抗衡"——对此，自由精神意识中的人这样回应：
"Freedom! Thou kindly and human name, thou that dost comprise all that is morally most lovable, all that my humanity most prizes, and that makest me the servant of nobody, thou that settest up no mere law, but awaitest what my moral love itself will recognise as law because in the face of every merely imposed law it feels itself unfree."
"自由！你亲切、人性的名字，你包含一切道德上可爱的东西——那最能彰显我人性尊严的东西，你不使我成为任何人的仆役；你不仅仅颁布一条法则，而是等待着我自己的道德之爱将认定为法则的东西——因为它在面对任何强加的法则时都感到不自由。"
We must not coin the formula: Human beings exist only in order to realise a moral world order which is quite distinct from themselves. (...) so the human being does not exist for the sake of morality, but morality exists through the presence of human beings. Free human beings act morally because they have moral ideas; they do not act in order that morality may come into being.
不可以确立这样的公式：人的存在是为了实现一个与他相分离的道德世界秩序。……人的存在不是为了道德，而是道德通过人而存在。自由的人道德地行动，因为他拥有一个道德理念；但他行动，并不是为了使道德得以产生。
The human individual is the source of all morality and the centre of earthly life. State and society exist only because they have arisen as a necessary consequence of the life of individuals.
人类个体是一切道德的源泉，也是地球生命的中心。国家与社会的存在，仅仅是因为它们作为个体生命的必然结果而产生。
