Chapter 11 – Philosophy of Freedom

Chapter XI

World Purpose and Life Purpose
(Human Destiny)

第十一章

世界目标与人生目标
（人类命运）

Purposefulness sets up a special condition for the sequence of phenomena. True purposefulness really exists only if, in contrast to the relationship of cause and effect where the earlier event determines the later, the reverse is the case and the later event influences the earlier one.

“合目的性”是现象相继过程中的一种特定形式。真正现实的合目的性只有在这样一种情况下才存在：与因果关系中先前事件决定后来事件相反，后来事件反过来对先前事件起决定作用。

One performs an action of which one has previously formed an idea, and one allows this idea to determine one's action. Thus the later (the deed) influences the earlier (the doer) with the help of the mental picture. For there to be a purposeful connection, this detour through the mental picture is absolutely necessary.

人完成一个行动，是因为他事先在心中表象了这个行动，并让这个表象决定自己的行动。后来者，即行动，借助表象作用于先前者，即行动的人。通过表象绕行这一步，对于形成合目的的联系是绝对必要的。

The percept of the effect must always follow upon the percept of the cause. If the effect is to have a real influence upon the cause, it can do so only by means of the conceptual factor. For the perceptual factor of the effect simply does not exist prior to the perceptual factor of the cause.

对结果的感知总只能跟随在对原因的感知之后。如果结果要对原因产生真实影响，那么这只能通过概念因素来实现。因为结果的感知因素在原因的感知因素之前根本尚不存在。

For a purposeful connection to exist, it is not only necessary to have an ideal, law-determined connection between the later and the earlier, but the concept (the law) of the effect must really influence the cause, that is, by means of a perceptible process. A perceptible influence of a concept upon something else, however, is to be observed only in human actions.

但要形成合目的的联系，并不只需要后来者与先前者之间理念上的、合规律的联系；结果的概念（即规律）还必须真实地、通过一个可感知的过程影响原因。然而，一个概念对其他事物产生可感知的影响，我们只能在人类行动中观察到。

The naive human being knows how they bring an event about and from this they conclude that nature will do it in the same way. In the connections of nature which are purely ideal they find not only invisible forces but also invisible real purposes.

天真的人知道自己如何促成一个事件，于是推断自然也会以同样方式行事。在纯粹理念性的自然联系中，他不仅看见不可见的力量，也看见不可感知的真实目的。

Monism rejects the concept of purpose in every sphere, with the sole exception of human action. It looks for laws of nature, but not for purposes of nature. Purposes of nature are arbitrary assumptions no less than are imperceptible forces.

一元论在一切领域中都拒绝目的概念，唯一的例外是人类行动。它寻找自然规律，而不是自然目的。自然目的和不可感知的力量一样，都是任意的假设。

Nothing is purposeful except what the human being has first made so, for purposefulness arises only through the realisation of an idea. In a realistic sense, an idea can become effective only in the human being.

只有人先使之具有目的的东西，才是合目的的；因为只有通过一个理念的实现，合目的之物才会产生。但理念只有在人之中，才在现实意义上成为有效力量。

To the question: what is the life task for the human being? there can be for monism but one answer: The task they set themself. My mission in the world is not predetermined, but is at every moment the one I choose for myself. I do not embark upon my journey through life with set marching orders.

对于“人在生活中有什么任务？”这个问题，一元论只能回答：人给自己设定的任务。我的世界使命并不是预先决定的，而是在每一个时刻由我自己选择的。我并不是带着固定的行军路线踏上人生道路。

Ideas are realised purposefully only by human beings. Consequently it is not permissible to speak of the embodiment of ideas by history. All such phrases as 'history is the evolution of mankind towards freedom', or 'the realisation of the moral world order' and so on, are, from a monistic point of view, unsupportable.

理念只有通过人才能以合目的的方式实现。因此，说理念通过历史而体现出来，是不恰当的。诸如“历史是人类走向自由的发展”，或“道德世界秩序的实现”等说法，从一元论观点来看都是站不住脚的。

But since underlying all percepts there are laws (ideas) which we discover through our thinking, it follows that the systematic coherence of the parts of a perceptual whole is simply the ideal coherence of the parts of an ideal whole contained in this perceptual whole.

但是，由于一切感知都以规律（理念）为基础，而这些规律是我们通过思维发现的，所以一个感知整体各组成部分的有计划的协调，正是包含在这个感知整体中的理念整体各组成部分在理念上的协调。

An animal certainly is not determined by an idea floating in the air, but it definitely is determined by an idea inborn in it and constituting the law of its being. It is just because the idea is not external to the object, but works within it as its very essence, that we cannot speak of purposefulness.

动物当然不是由一个悬浮在空中的理念所决定的，而是由一个内在于它、构成其合规律本质的理念所决定的。正因为理念并不在事物之外，而是在事物之中作为其本质发挥作用，所以不能说这里有合目的性。

I construct a machine purposefully if I connect its parts together in a way that is not given in nature. The purposefulness of the arrangement consists in just this, that I embody, as its idea, the working principle of the machine into the machine itself. The machine becomes thereby an object of perception with the idea corresponding to it. Objects of nature are no different.

当我把机器的各个部分置入一种它们天然并不具有的联系中时，我就是以合目的的方式塑造这台机器。这种装置的合目的性在于，我把机器的运作方式作为它的理念置于其基础之中。机器由此成为一个具有相应理念的感知对象。自然存在物也是这样的存在。

Whoever calls a thing purposeful simply because it is formed according to a law, may, if they wish, apply the same term to the objects of nature. But they must not confuse this kind of lawfulness with that of subjective human action.

如果有人因为一个事物是按规律形成的，就称它为合目的的，那么他也可以把这种称呼用于自然存在物。只是不能把这种合规律性同主观的人类行动中的合规律性混为一谈。

But in nature we can nowhere point to concepts acting as causes; the concept invariably turns out to be nothing but the ideal link connecting cause and effect. Causes are present in nature only in the form of percepts.

但在自然中，任何地方都无法证明概念作为原因存在；概念始终只是原因与结果之间的理念性联系。自然中的原因只以感知的形式存在。

If here the concept of purpose is rejected also for the spiritual world, lying outside human action, it is because something is revealed in that world which is higher than the kind of purpose realised in the human kingdom.

如果这里甚至对处于人类行动之外的精神世界也拒绝目的思想，那是因为在这个世界中显现出来的，是高于在人类之中实现的目的的东西。

And when we say that the thought of a purposeful destiny for the human race, modelled on human purposefulness, is misconceived we mean that the individual sets themself purposes, and that these combine to produce the effective working together of all humanity. This outcome is then something higher than its component parts, the purposes of human beings.

如果说按照人类合目的性的模式来设想人类整体的合目的使命是一种错误思想，那么意思是：个体的人为自己设定目的，而人类整体活动的结果正是由这些目的组合而成的。这个结果于是高于它的各个组成部分，也就是高于个体的人类目的。