Chapter XII/1
Moral Imagination
(Darwinism and Morality)
第十二章/1
道德想象
（达尔文主义与道德）
A free spirit acts according to their impulses, that is, according to intuitions selected by thinking from the totality of their world of ideas.
自由精神按照自己的冲动而行动；这些冲动就是直觉，是通过思维从其整个理念世界中选择出来的。
For an unfree spirit, the reason why they single out a particular intuition from their world of ideas in order to make it the basis of an action, lies in the world of percepts given to them, that is, in their past experiences. They recall, before coming to a decision, what someone else has done or recommended as suitable in a similar case, or what God has commanded to be done in such a case, and so on, and they act accordingly.
对于不自由的精神来说，他之所以从自己的理念世界中分离出某个特定直觉，并把它作为行动的基础，其原因在于给予他的感知世界，也就是他以往的经历。在作出决定之前，他会回想别人曾在类似情况下做了什么，或认为应当做什么，或上帝在这种情况下命令了什么，等等，然后据此行动。
For a free spirit, these prior conditions are not the only impulses to action. They make a wholly original decision. What others have done in such a case concerns them as little as what anyone may have decreed. They have purely ideal reasons which lead them to select from the sum of their concepts just one in particular, and then to translate it into action.
对于自由精神来说，这些先决条件并不是行动的唯一推动力。他作出的是一个真正原初的决定。他既不关心别人曾在这种情况下做过什么，也不关心别人为此下达过什么命令。他有纯粹理念性的理由，促使他从自己的概念总和中恰好提出某一个概念，并把它转化为行动。
The concept will have to realise itself in a single concrete occurrence. As a concept it will not be able to contain this specific event. It will refer to the event only in the same way as a concept is in general related to a percept, for example, the general concept of the lion to a specific lion.
概念必须在一个具体的个别事件中实现。作为概念，它不可能包含这个个别情形。它只能像概念一般关联于感知那样关联于这个个别情形，例如“狮子”这个概念关联于某一只狮子。
For the unfree spirit, this link is given from the outset. Motives are present in their consciousness from the outset in the form of mental pictures. Whenever there is something they want to carry out, they do it as they have seen it done, or as they have been told to do it in this particular instance.
对于不自由的精神来说，这个中介环节从一开始就是给定的。动机一开始就作为表象存在于他的意识之中。当他想执行某件事时，他就按照自己见过的方式去做，或者按照针对这个个别情形所受的命令去做。
Hence authority works best through examples, that is, through providing to the consciousness of the unfree spirit quite specific individual actions.
因此，权威最有效的作用方式是通过榜样，也就是把完全确定的个别行动传递给不自由精神的意识。
Rules have less value for acting positively than for refraining from certain actions. Laws take on the form of general concepts only when they forbid actions, but not when they prescribe them.
规则对于积极行动的价值，低于它们对于禁止某些行动的价值。法律只有在禁止行动时才进入一般概念形式；当它命令人去做某事时，则不是如此。
Laws concerning what they ought to do must be given to the unfree spirit in quite concrete form: (...) A conceptual form belongs to laws for inhibiting actions: (...)
关于他应当做什么的法律，必须以完全具体的形式给予不自由的精神：……而用于阻止行动的法律，则具有概念形式：……
These laws, too, influence the unfree spirit only by means of a concrete mental picture, for example, that of the appropriate punishment, or the pangs of conscience, or eternal damnation, and so on.
然而，这些法律对不自由精神发生作用，也只是通过指向某种具体表象，例如相应的现世惩罚、良心痛苦、永恒诅咒，等等。
Whenever the motive for an action is present in a general conceptual form (for example: 'thou shalt do good to thy fellow human being!', 'thou shalt live so that thou best promotest thy welfare!') then for each particular case the concrete mental picture of the action (the relation of the concept to a content of perception) must first be found.
一旦某个行动的推动力以一般概念形式存在，例如“你应当善待你的同胞！”“你应当以最能促进自身福祉的方式生活！”，那么在每一个个别情形中，都必须先找到行动的具体表象，也就是概念与某个感知内容之间的关系。
For the free spirit who is not driven by any example, nor fear of punishment or the like, this translation of the concept into a mental picture is always necessary.
对于自由精神来说，没有榜样、没有对惩罚的恐惧等来驱使他，因此这种从概念到表象的转化始终是必要的。
The human being produces concrete mental pictures from the sum of their ideas chiefly by means of the imagination. Therefore what the free spirit needs in order to realise their ideas, in order to be effective, is moral imagination. This is the source of action for the free spirit.
人首先通过想象力，从自己的理念总和中产生具体表象。因此，自由精神为了实现自己的理念、使自己得以贯彻，所需要的就是道德想象力。它是自由精神行动的源泉。
Moral action, then, presupposes, in addition to the faculty of having moral ideas (moral intuition) and moral imagination, the ability to transform the world of percepts, within the limits of the laws of nature by which these are connected. This ability is moral technique.
因此，道德行动除了预设道德理念能力和道德想象力之外，还预设一种能力：能够改造感知世界，而不破坏其自然规律的联系。这种能力就是道德技术。
Hence it is perfectly possible for human beings without moral imagination to receive such mental pictures from others, and to manifest them skillfully in the real world. Conversely, it may happen that human beings with moral imagination lack technical skill, and must get the help of other human beings for the realisation of their mental pictures.
因此，完全可能出现这样的情况：没有道德想象力的人从别人那里接受道德表象，并且熟练地把它们印入现实。相反的情况也可能出现：有道德想象力的人缺乏技术上的熟练能力，于是必须借助他人来实现自己的表象。
In so far as it is necessary for acting morally, that we have knowledge of the objects within our sphere of action, our action will be based on such knowledge. What we are concerned with here are laws of nature. We are dealing with natural science, not ethics.
只要道德行动需要我们认识行动领域中的对象，我们的行动就建立在这种认识之上。这里需要考虑的是自然规律。我们面对的是自然科学，而不是伦理学。
Moral imagination and the faculty of having moral ideas can become objects of knowledge only after they have been produced by the individual. By then, however, they no longer regulate life, for they have already regulated it. They must now be regarded as effective causes, like all others (they are purposes only for the subject). We therefore deal with them as with a natural history of moral ideas.
道德想象力和道德理念能力，只有在由个体产生之后，才能成为知识的对象。但到那时，它们已经不再调节生活，而是已经调节过生活了。它们应当像其他一切作用原因一样被理解；它们只是对于主体而言才是目的。我们研究它们，是把它们作为一种道德表象的自然学说来研究。
The functioning of the organism occurs without any action on our part; its laws are already established as part of the world and we can therefore find them and apply them once discovered. Moral laws, on the other hand, are first created by us. We cannot apply them until we have created them.
有机体的活动不需要我们的参与就已经存在；我们在世界中发现其规律已经现成存在，因此可以去寻找它们，然后应用所发现的规律。但道德规律却是由我们首先创造出来的。在它们被创造之前，我们无法应用它们。
For moral laws apply to individuals and not, as natural laws do, to members of a species.
因为它们指向的是个体，而不像自然规律那样指向某一类属的样本。
Considered as an organism, I belong to a particular species and I shall live in accordance with nature when I apply the natural laws of my species to my particular case; as a moral being, I am an individual and have laws of my very own.
作为有机体，我是这样一个类属样本；当我在自己的特殊情形中应用该类属的自然规律时，我就是按照自然生活。作为道德存在，我则是个体，并拥有我完全属于自己的规律。
