Chapter XIII/2
The Value of Life
(Optimism and Pessimism)
第十三章/2
生命的价值
（乐观与悲观）
A pessimistic ethics believes that it must present the pursuit of happiness as an impossibility for human beings so that they may devote themselves to their proper moral tasks. But these moral tasks are nothing but specific natural and spiritual impulses; and human beings will seek to satisfy them irrespective of any suffering they may experience.
悲观主义伦理学认为，必须向人表明追求幸福是不可能的，这样他才会献身于自己真正的道德任务。但这些道德任务并不是别的，正是具体的自然冲动和精神冲动；而人追求这些冲动的满足，即使其中会伴随不快。
The pursuit of happiness which the pessimist would eliminate simply doesn't exist. At the same time human beings seek to fulfill the tasks whose true nature they recognise as this lies in the very nature of their being.
因此，悲观主义想要根除的那种追求幸福，根本并不存在。人必须完成的任务，他之所以完成，是因为当他真正认识到这些任务的本质时，他凭借自身本质而愿意完成它们。
Morality lies in striving for a goal that one recognises as justified; it is human nature to pursue it as long as the pain incurred does not inhibit the desire for it altogether. This is the essence of all genuine will.
道德性存在于对一个被认识为正当的目标的追求之中；只要与之相连的不快没有麻痹对它的欲求，追随这个目标就存在于人的本质之中。而这正是一切真实意愿的本质。
Ethical behaviour is not based upon the elimination of all striving for pleasure such that anaemic abstract ideas establish their authority unopposed by a strong desire for the enjoyment of life. Ethical behaviour is instead based on a strong will supported by ideal intuitions, a will that reaches its goal even though the path is strewn with obstacles.
伦理学并不建立在根除一切对快乐的追求之上，仿佛这样苍白无力的抽象理念才能在没有强烈生活享受渴望抵抗的地方建立统治；伦理学建立在强有力的意愿之上，这种意愿由理念直觉所承载，即使通往目标的道路布满荆棘，也能达到目标。
Moral ideals spring from the moral imagination of the human being. Their realisation depends on the desire for them being intense enough to overcome pain and misery. Moral ideals are human intuitions, they are the driving forces harnessed by the spirit; we are bound to them, because their realisation is our highest pleasure.
道德理想源自人的道德想象力。它们能否实现，取决于人是否足够强烈地渴望它们，以克服痛苦和折磨。它们是他的直觉，是他的精神所张紧的动力；他意愿它们，因为它们的实现就是他的最高快乐。
They have no need for an ethics that prohibits the striving for pleasure, only then to prescribe for them what they shall strive for. They will strive for moral ideals if their moral imagination is sufficiently active and able to provide them with intuitions which strengthen the will to overcome all the obstacles inherent in their constitution, including the suffering that belongs to it.
他不需要先由伦理学禁止自己追求快乐，然后再由伦理学命令自己应当追求什么。当他的道德想象力足够活跃，能够给予他直觉，使他的意愿获得力量，以克服其自身组织中存在的阻力，包括必要的不快时，他就会追求道德理想。
Anyone who would eradicate the pleasure brought by the fulfillment of human desires will first have to make the human being a slave who acts not out of their own will but only because they should. For the achievement of what one wills gives pleasure.
谁若想根除人在满足自身欲求时的快乐，就必须先把人变成奴隶，使他行动不是因为他愿意，而只是因为他应当。因为达成所意愿之物会产生快乐。
What we call good is not what a human being ought to do but what they will to do when they fully develop their true nature as a human being.
所谓善，并不是人应当做的东西，而是当人展开完整而真实的人性时，他所意愿的东西。
The human being values the fulfillment of a desire because the desire springs from their own being. What is achieved has its value because it is the result of human will.
人赋予某种欲求的满足以价值，因为这种欲求源自他的本质。所达到之物有其价值，是因为它曾被意愿。
An ethics built on pessimism arises from the disregard of moral imagination. Only if one considers that the individual human spirit is itself incapable of giving content to its striving will one expect to see in all acts of will simply the desire for pleasure.
建立在悲观主义之上的伦理学，源自对道德想象力的轻视。只有那些不认为个体人的精神有能力为自己的追求赋予内容的人，才会把意愿的总和寻找于对快乐的渴望之中。
A person without imagination creates no moral ideas. They must receive them from someone else. Their bodily nature sees to it that they strive to satisfy their lower desires. But the development of the whole human being also includes those desires that originate in the spirit.
缺乏想象力的人不会创造道德理念。这些理念必须被给予他。至于他追求低级欲求的满足，这一点由物质自然来保证。但完整人的展开，也包括那些源自精神的欲求。
Every ethical system that demands of the human being that they should suppress their own will in order to fulfill tasks that they have not themselves willed, reckons not with the whole human being but with one in which the faculty of spiritual desire is lacking.
任何要求人压制自己的意愿、以完成他并不愿意完成的任务的伦理学，都没有把完整的人计算在内，而只是计算了一个缺乏精神欲求能力的人。
For a human being who is harmoniously developed, the so-called ideals of virtue lie, not without, but within the sphere of their own being. Moral action consists not in the elimination of a one-sided personal will but in the full development of human nature.
对于和谐发展的人来说，所谓善的理念并不在他的本质范围之外，而在其内。道德行动并不在于消灭一种片面的自我意志，而在于人性的充分发展。
It cannot be denied that the views here outlined may easily be misunderstood. Immature people without moral imagination like to look upon the instincts of their half-developed natures as the fullest expression of the human potential. They reject all moral ideas which they have not themselves produced, in order that they may 'act out in life' unimpeded.
不可否认，这里所描述的观点很容易被误解。没有道德想象力的不成熟的人，常常喜欢把自己半成形本性的本能看作完整的人性内容，并拒绝一切不是由他们自己产生的道德理念，以便能够不受干扰地“活出自己”。
We will expect more from the mature person than from someone who lacks the education that would enable their moral nature to penetrate through the shell containing their lower passions
对于那些还必须通过教育，才能使其道德本性突破低级激情蛋壳的人，不能要求他们做到适用于成熟之人的事情。
My intention was to demonstrate the possibility of freedom, and freedom is manifested not in actions limited by bodily or psychological constraints, but in actions sustained by spiritual intuitions.
因为这里要证明的是自由的可能性；而自由并不显现在出于感官或心理强迫的行动中，而显现在由精神直觉承载的行动中。
The mature human being acts as they will to act, that is, in accordance with the standard of their ethical intuitions; and they find in the achievement of what they will the true enjoyment of life. They determine the value of life by measuring achievements against aims.
他按照自己所愿而行动，也就是按照自己的伦理直觉行动；并且他把达到自己所愿之物感受为真正的生活享受。他根据已达到之物与所追求之物之间的关系来确定生活的价值。
An ethics which replaces 'will' with mere 'should', 'inclination' with mere 'duty', will consequently determine the value of the human being by measuring the fulfillment of duty against the demands that it makes on them. It would measure the human being by a standard external to their own being.
那种以单纯的“应当”取代意愿、以单纯的义务取代倾向的伦理学，必然会根据义务所要求的东西与人所完成的东西之间的关系来确定人的价值。它用一个位于人自身本质之外的尺度来衡量人。
The view which I have here developed refers the human being back to themself. It recognises as the true value of life only what each individual regards as such, according to the standard of their own will. It no more acknowledges a value of life that is not recognised by the individual than it does a purpose of life that has not originated in them. The individual who stands in full self-knowledge is seen as both master and judge.
这里展开的观点把人带回到他自身。它只承认个体按照自己的意愿所看作生活价值的东西，才是真正的生活价值。它既不知道一种不被个体承认的生活价值，也不知道一种并非从个体自身产生的生活目的。它在被全面透视的本质性个体中，看见他自己的主人和自己的评估者。
Ethical individualism is well able to present morality in its full dignity, for it sees true morality not in what brings about the agreement of an act of will with a standard of behaviour in an external way, but in what arises in the human being when they develop their moral will as an integral part of their whole being so that to do what is not moral appears to them as a stunting and crippling of their nature.
伦理个体主义适合于以完整的尊严来呈现道德性，因为它并不认为真正道德的是那种以外在方式使意愿与规范相一致的东西；真正道德的是当人在自身中把道德意愿作为其完整本质的一部分展开时，从人之中生起的东西。如此一来，做不道德之事在他看来就是对自身本质的残缺和损害。
