Chapter III/1
Thinking in the Service of Knowledge
第三章之一
作为认识工具的思维
When I observe how a billiard ball, when struck, transfers its motion to another, I remain entirely without influence on the course of this observed process. The direction of motion and the velocity of the second ball are determined by the direction and velocity of the first.
当我观察一个台球被击中时是如何将自己的运动传递给另一个球的，对于所观察的这一事件的进展我一直完全没有影响力。第二个球的运动方向和速度是由第一个球的方向和速度所决定的。
As long as I remain a mere spectator, I can say something about the movement of the second ball only after it has taken place. It is quite different when I begin to reflect on the content of my observation.
只要我一直只是作为一名观察者，那么关于第二个球的运动，就只能当它发生之后我才知道可以说些什么。当我开始思索所观察的内容时，情况就不一样了。
The purpose of my reflection is to form concepts of the event (...) I try, in other words, to add to the event which takes place without my participation a second process which takes place in the conceptual sphere. This latter one is dependent on me.
我的思索的目的是对发生的事件形成概念。(...) 换而言之，在这个没有我的参与而发生的事件之上，我试图将一个发生于概念领域的第二过程附加进来。后者取决于我。
As surely as the event takes place independently of me, so surely is the conceptual process unable to take place without me.
无疑，正在发生的事件是独立于我而运行的，同样确定的是概念过程如果没有我的参与是无法发生的。
There is a profound difference between the ways in which, for me, the sequence of events are related to one another before, and after, the discovery of the corresponding concepts. Mere observation can trace the sequence of events as they occur, but their connection remains hidden without the help of concepts.
对我来说，一个事件的不同部分之间相互关联的方式，在相应概念发现之前与之后，存在着深远的差别。单纯的观察能够在一个特定事件的不同部分发生时追踪到它们，但它们之间的关联，如果没有概念的帮助，仍然是模糊的。
Observation and thinking are the two points of departure for all human learning in so far as this is the result of conscious effort. Everyday common sense as well as the most complicated scientific research, rest on these two fundamental pillars of the mind.
观察与思考是人所有灵性追求的两个基本出发点，只要他已经意识到了这样的追求。日常的常识以及最复杂的科学研究，都建立在心灵的这两大基本支柱之上。
Philosophers have started from various primary antitheses: idea and reality, subject and object, appearance and thing-in-itself, I and Not-I, idea and will, concept and matter, force and substance, the conscious and the unconscious. It is easy to show, however, that all these antitheses must be preceded by that of observation and thinking, this being the most significant one for the human being.
哲学家们曾经从不同的基本对立面出发去探寻：观念与现实，主体与客体，表象与本体，“吾”与“非吾”，观念与意志，念与实体，力量与物质，有意识的与无意识的。然而，很容易证明，所有这些对立面必须以观察与思考的对立面为先导，这一对立面对人类来说是最为重要的。
Whatever principle we choose to lay down, we must either demonstrate that somewhere we have observed it, or we must enunciate it in the form of a clear thought which can be re-thought by any other thinker. Every philosopher who sets out to discuss their fundamental principles must express them in conceptual form and thus use thinking. They therefore indirectly admit that their activity presupposes thinking.
无论我们欲主张何种原理，必须要么证明曾在某个地方对其进行过观察；要么以清晰思维的方式将其阐明，并且这得经得起其他任何思考者的再思考。每一位哲学家，如果打算论述他的根本原则，就必须以概念化的形式将其表达出来，于是，就会用到思考。因此，他其实已间接承认了，自己的行为是以思考为先决条件的。
In the formation of world events, thinking may play a minor role; but in the forming of a view about them, there can be no doubt that it plays the leading role.
世界上的现象，在其发生的过程中，思考的作用也许很小；但在对其形成某种观点的过程中，毫无疑问，思考的作用是第一位的。
We rely on observation due to the nature of our human constitution. Our thinking about a horse and the object 'horse' are two things which for us emerge separate from each other. This object is accessible to us only by means of observation. As little as we can form a concept of a horse by merely staring at the animal, just as little are we able by mere thinking to produce a corresponding object.
至于观察，对它的需要是由于我们身体的构建方式。对一匹马的思考，与“马”这一客体，对我们来说是分别呈现出来的两种事物。只有借助观察，该客体才能为我们所理解。仅仅是盯着这一动物看，我们根本不可能形成一个关于马的概念，同样，仅仅通过思考，我们也不可能创造出一个相应的客体。
In the sequence of time, observation does in fact come before thinking. For thinking itself we must also get to know first through observation.
在时间顺序上，观察甚至是先于思考发生的。因为即便对思考来说，我们也必须首先通过观察才能了解它。
Everything that enters the circle of our experience, we first become aware of through observation. The content of sensation, perception and contemplation, all feelings, acts of will, dreams and fancies, mental pictures, concepts and ideas, all illusions and hallucinations, are given to us through observation.
任何进入我们体验领域的东西，我们首先是通过观察觉察到它们的。感受内容，感知内容，直观内容，我们的情感，意志行为，梦与幻像，心象，概念与观念，所有的幻觉与幻想，这些都是通过观察赋予我们的。
I observe the table, and I carry out the thinking about the table, but I do not at the same moment observe this. I must first take up a standpoint outside my own activity if, in addition to observing the table, I want also to observe my thinking about the table.
我观察一张桌子，并针对这张桌子进行思考，但是我并没有在同一时刻对此思考进行观察。如果，除了观察这张桌子之外，我也想观察自己对该桌子的思考，那我就必须首先将自己转移到一个位于自己行为之外的立场。
Whereas observing things and events, and thinking about them, are everyday occurrences and part of my daily existence, I enter an exceptional state when I observe the thinking itself.
尽管对客体和事件的观察以及关于它们的思考是完全日常的、充斥在我持续不断的生命流之中的状态，然而对思考自身的观察，却是一种特殊例外的情形。
We must be quite clear about the fact that, in observing thinking, we are applying to it a procedure which constitutes the normal course of events for the study of the whole of the rest of the world-content, but which in this normal course of events is not applied to thinking itself.
我们必须非常清楚一件事，那就是在对思考进行观察的过程中，我们将一种程序运用于其中了，这一程序对世界内容中所有其它部分的研究构建了一个标准状态，但是遵循这个标准状态对思考本身并不适用。
In reflecting upon an event, I am in no way concerned with an effect upon myself. I can learn nothing about myself through knowing the concepts which correspond to the observed change in a pane of glass by a stone thrown against it. But I do very definitely learn something about myself when I know the feeling which a certain event arouses in me.
在我思索一个事件的过程中，所涉及的根本不是该事件对我的影响。当看到一块石头被扔到一片玻璃上时，通过获知与观察到的变化相对应的一些概念，我根本无法获得任何关于自己的认知。但是，当我获知某个事件于我内在引发的情感时，我的的确确会非常清晰地了解到关于自己性格的一些内容。
The peculiar nature of thinking lies just in this, that it is an activity which is directed solely upon the observed object and not on the one doing the thinking.
思考的特殊本性恰恰在于此，即思考这种行为，仅仅指向被观察的客体，而并没有指向思考的人。
This is just the peculiar nature of thinking, that the thinker forgets their thinking while actually engaged in it. What occupies their attention is not their thinking, but the observable object of their thinking.
这恰恰正是思考特有的本性，就是说，当一个思考者致力于思考时，他就会忘记自己的思考。占据其注意力的并非他的思考，而是思考之客体，即他正在观察的内容。
The first observation which we make about thinking is therefore this: that it is the unobserved element in our ordinary consciousness.
因此，我们针对思考所能做出的第一项观察内容就是我们通常的灵性生活中没有被观察到的元素。
The reason why we do not observe the thinking that goes on in our ordinary life is none other than this, that it is due to our own activity.
我们为什么不去观察那些发生在日常灵性生活中的思考呢，不是因为别的，正是由于思考是以我们自己的行为为基础的。
In other words, while I am thinking I pay no heed to my thinking, which is of my own making, but only to the object of my thinking, which is not of my making.
换句话说，当我正在思考时我并未留意我自己创造出来的我的思考，我关注的仅仅是并非我创造出来的我的思考的客体。
I am, moreover, in the same position when I enter into the exceptional state and reflect on my own thinking. I can never observe my present thinking; I can only subsequently take the experiences of my thinking process as the object of fresh thinking. (...) The thinking to be observed is never that in which I am actually engaged, but another one.
甚至，即便当我进入那个例外情形中并对自己的思考过程进行思索时，我仍处于相同的境地。我永远无法观察自己当下的思考；而只能事后把我对自己的思考过程所拥有的众多体验当作新一轮思考的客体。(...)那个应当被观察的思考，永远不会是我实际上正参与其中的思考，而是另一个。
It is immaterial whether for this purpose I make observations of my own former thinking or follow the thinking process of another person or, as in the example of the motions of the billiard balls, assume an imagined thinking process.
为了这一目的，至于我会观察自己以前的思考，还是会追踪另一个人的思考过程，也或者就像在上文台球的运动那一例子当中、会设想一种虚构的思考过程，这无关紧要。
