Chapter X
Philosophy and Monism
第十章
哲学与一元论
The naive human being, who acknowledges as real only what they can see with their eyes and grasp with their hands, requires for their moral life, also, a basis for action that shall be perceptible to the senses. They require someone or something to impart to them the basis for their action in a way that their senses can comprehend.
天真的人只承认眼睛能看见、双手能触摸到的东西为现实，因此他也要求自己的道德生活有能够被感官感知的动机。他要求有一个存在，以他的感官能够理解的方式，把这些动机传达给他。
The highest stage of development of naive realism in the sphere of morality is that where the moral commandment (moral idea) has no connection to any other being other than oneself and is thought of, hypothetically, as being an absolute power in one's own inner life. What the human being first took to be the external voice of God, they now take as an independent power within them, and speak of this inner voice in such a way as to identify it with conscience.
天真实在论在道德领域中的最高发展阶段，是把道德诫命（道德理念）同任何外在存在分离开来，并假设它是在自己内心中的一种绝对力量。人最初听到的是外在的上帝之声；现在，他把它听成自己内心中的一种独立力量，并把这种内在声音称为良心。
But in doing this he has already gone beyond the stage of naive consciousness into the sphere where the moral laws have become independently existing standards. There they are no longer carried by real bearers, but have become metaphysical entities existing in their own right. They are analogous to the invisible 'visible forces' of metaphysical realism, which does not seek reality through the part of it that the human being has in their thinking, but hypothetically appends it to actual experience.
但这样一来，天真意识的阶段已经被离开了，我们进入了这样一个领域：道德法则作为规范被独立化。它们不再有承载者，而成为凭自身存在的形而上实体。它们类似于形而上实在论中那些“不可见却又被设想为可见”的力量；这种实在论并不通过人在思维中参与现实的方式来寻找现实，而是假设性地把现实补加到经验之上。
These extra-human moral standards always occur as accompanying features of metaphysical realism. For metaphysical realism is bound to seek the origin of morality in the sphere of extra-human reality.
超人的道德规范也总是作为这种形而上实在论的伴随现象出现。这种形而上实在论也必须把道德的起源寻找于超人现实的领域之中。
If the hypothetically assumed entity is conceived as in itself unthinking, acting according to purely mechanical laws, as materialism would have it, then it must also produce out of itself, by purely mechanical necessity, the human individual with all their characteristic features. The consciousness of freedom can then be nothing more than an illusion. For though I consider myself the author of my action, it is the matter of which I am composed and the movements going on in it that are working in me.
如果被假设的存在被理解为本身没有思想、只按照纯粹机械规律活动的东西，正如唯物主义所设想的那样，那么它也会通过纯粹机械的必然性，从自身中产生出人的个体以及这个个体的一切。这样，自由意识就只能是一种幻觉。因为当我以为自己是行动的创造者时，在我之中起作用的其实是构成我的物质及其运动过程。
Another possibility is that a human being may picture the extra-human Absolute that lies behind the world of appearances as a spiritual being. In this case they will also seek the impulse for their actions in a corresponding spiritual force. (...) The human being shall do as this Absolute being wills.
另一种可能是：有人在某种精神性存在中，看见隐藏在现象背后的超人绝对者。那么他也会在这种精神力量中寻找行动的推动力。……人应当去做这个存在所意愿的事。
Whereas the materialistic dualist turns the human being into an automaton whose actions are only the result of a purely mechanical system, the spiritualistic dualist (that is, one who sees the Absolute, the Being-in-itself, as something spiritual in which human beings have no share in their conscious experience) makes them a slave to the will of the Absolute.
正如唯物主义的二元论者把人变成自动机器，其行动只是纯粹机械规律的结果；精神主义的二元论者也把人变成那个绝对者意志的奴隶。所谓精神主义的二元论者，就是把绝对者、自在之物看作一种精神存在，而人的有意识经验并不参与其中的人。
As in materialism, so also in one-sided spiritualism, in fact in any kind of metaphysical realism which infers without experience something extra-human as the true reality, freedom can find no place.
在唯物主义之内，在片面的精神主义之内，总之，在那种推论出超人之物为真正现实、却并不经验这种现实的形而上实在论之内，自由都是被排除的。
Metaphysical as well as naive realism, consistently followed through, must deny freedom for one and the same reason: they both see the human being as doing no more than carrying out or executing principles forced upon them by necessity.
天真实在论和这种形而上实在论，如果贯彻到底，就必须出于同一个理由否认自由：因为它们在人之中只看见那些必然强加于他的原则的执行者或完成者。
Naive realism destroys freedom by subjecting the human being to the authority of a perceptible being or of one conceived on the analogy of a perceptible being, or eventually to the authority of the abstract inner voice which it interprets as 'conscience'; the metaphysician, who merely infers the extra-human reality, cannot acknowledge freedom because they see the human being as mechanically or morally governed by a 'Being-in-itself'.
天真实在论通过使人服从某个可感知的存在，或某个按感知类比而设想出来的存在，或者最后服从那种被解释为“良心”的抽象内在声音，来扼杀自由；而那个仅仅推论超人之物的形而上学者，也不能承认自由，因为他让人由某个“自在之物”以机械方式或道德方式加以决定。
Monism will have to recognise that naive realism is partially justified because it recognises the legitimacy of the world of percepts.
一元论必须承认天真实在论具有部分正当性，因为它承认感知世界的正当性。
Whoever is incapable of producing moral ideas through intuition is bound to accept them from others.
凡是不能通过直觉产生道德理念的人，就必须从别人那里接受这些理念。
In so far as a human being receives their moral principles from without, they are in fact unfree. But monism attaches equal significance to the idea as to the percept. The idea, however, can find expression in the human individual. In so far as the human being follows the impulses coming from this side, they feel themself to be free.
只要人从外部接受自己的道德原则，他实际上就是不自由的。但是一元论把理念和感知赋予同等的重要性。而理念能够在人的个体中显现。只要人遵循来自这一方面的推动，他就感到自己是自由的。
According to the monistic view, the human being may act unfreely, when they obey some perceptible external compulsion; they can act freely, when they obey none but themself. Monism does recognise any unconscious compulsion hidden behind both percept and concept.
按照一元论的看法，当人服从一个可感知的外在强制时，他可以是不自由地行动；当他只服从自己时，他可以自由地行动。一元论不能承认那种隐藏在感知和概念背后的无意识强制。
If anyone asserts that the action of a fellow human being is done unfreely, then they must identify the thing or the person or the institution within the perceptible world, that has caused the person to act. If they base their assertion upon causes of action lying outside the world that is real to the senses and the spirit, then monism will disregard it.
如果有人声称另一个人的某个行动是不自由地完成的，那么他必须在可感知的世界之内指出那个促使此人行动的事物、人或制度；如果声称者诉诸感性和精神现实世界之外的行动原因，那么一元论不能接受这样的说法。
According to the monistic view, then, human deeds are partly unfree, partly free. The human being finds themself to be unfree in the world of percepts, and at the same time they realise within themself the free spirit.
按照一元论的看法，人一部分是不自由地行动，一部分是自由地行动。他在感知世界中发现自己是不自由的，同时又在自身之中实现自由精神。
Monism does not see behind human deeds the purposes of a supreme ruler, foreign to them and determining them according to its will, but rather sees that human beings, in so far as they realise their intuitive ideas, pursue only their own human ends.
一元论在人类行动者背后，并不看见某种陌生的世界支配力量的目的，仿佛这种力量按照自身意志决定人类；相反，只要人实现直觉理念，他们追求的就只是他们自己的、人的目的。
Moreover, each individual pursues their own particular ends. For the world of ideas comes to expression, not in a group of people, but only in human individuals.
而且，每个个体都追求自己的特殊目的。因为理念世界并不是在一个人的共同体中展开自身，而只是在人类个体中展开自身。
Each one of us is called to become a free spirit, as is every rose bud to become a rose.
我们每个人都被召唤成为自由精神，正如每一颗玫瑰花芽都被召唤成为玫瑰。
Monism, then, in the sphere of true moral action, is a freedom philosophy. As a philosophy of reality, it rejects the metaphysical, unreal restrictions on the free spirit just as completely as it accepts the physical and historical (naively real) limitations of the naive human being.
因此，在真正道德行动的领域中，一元论就是自由哲学。因为它是现实哲学，所以它既拒绝对自由精神的形而上的、非现实的限制，也承认天真人所处的物理和历史的、天真现实的限制。
Since it does not consider the human being as a finished product, disclosing their full nature in every moment of their life, it regards the dispute as to whether the human being as such is free or not, to be of no consequence. It sees the human being in a process of development and asks whether, in the course of this development, the stage of the free spirit can be reached.
因为一元论并不把人看作一个已经完成的产物，并不认为人在生命的每一时刻都展开了自己的完整本质，所以关于“人本身是否自由”的争论，在它看来是重要的。它在人之中看见一个正在发展的存在，并追问：在这条发展道路上，是否也能够达到自由精神的阶段。
Monism is quite clear that a being acting under physical or moral compulsion cannot be a truly moral being. It regards the phases of automatic behaviour (following natural urges and instincts) and of obedient behaviour (following moral norms) as necessary preparatory stages of morality, but it also sees that both these transitory stages can be overcome by the free spirit.
一元论清楚地知道，一个在物理强制或道德强制之下行动的存在，不可能是真正道德的。它把经过自动行动（依照自然冲动和本能）以及经过服从性行动（依照道德规范）看作道德性的必要预备阶段；但它也认识到，自由精神能够超越这两个过渡阶段。
Morality is for the monist a specifically human quality, and spiritual freedom the human way of being moral.
对于一元论的信奉者来说，道德性是一种特有人类的性质，而自由则是人以道德方式存在的形式。
If we really understand how ideas are intuitively experienced in their self-sustaining essence, it becomes clear that in the act of knowing, the human being, on the periphery of the world of ideas, lives their way into something which is the same for all human beings. At the same time when, from this world of ideas, they derive the intuitions for their acts of will, they individualise a part of this world by the very activity they practice as a universal human one in the spiritual ideal process of knowing.
对于一种洞察来说，只要它看清理念如何作为一种立足于自身的本质性存在而被直觉地经验到，那么它就会明白：人在认识时，是在理念世界的范围内生活进入一种对所有人都统一的东西；但当他从这个理念世界中借取用于自己意志行动的直觉时，他就通过同一种活动，使理念世界的一个成员个体化。而这种活动，在认识的精神—理念过程中，是作为一种普遍人类的活动展开的。
What appears as a logical contradiction between the universal nature of cognitive ideas and the individual nature of moral ideas is the very thing that, when seen in its reality, becomes a living concept.
看似逻辑矛盾的东西，也就是认识理念的普遍性质与道德理念的个体性质，一旦在其现实中被观看，就恰恰成为一个活的概念。
It is a characteristic feature of the essential nature of the human being that what can be intuitively grasped swings to and fro within them, like a living pendulum, between universally valid knowledge and the individual experience of it.
人的本质有一个标志：在人之中，那种要由直觉把握的东西，像活的钟摆一样，在普遍有效的认识与对这种普遍者的个体体验之间来回摆动。
