Chapter V/2
The Act of Knowing
第五章/2
认知行为
The foregoing arguments show that it makes no sense to look for any common element in the separate entities of the world other than the ideal content that thinking offers us.
前述阐述证明：在世界的各个个别存在中，试图寻求除思维所呈现的观念性内容之外的其他共同之物，是荒诞不经的。
All attempts to find a unity in the world other than this internally coherent ideal content, which we gain by a thoughtful contemplation of our percepts, are bound to fail.
一切追求世界统一性的努力，若不以这个通过对感知进行思考考察而获得的、内在自洽的观念性内容为依归，都注定失败。
Rooted most deeply in the naive consciousness of mankind is the opinion that thinking is abstract, without any concrete content; it can at most give us an 'ideal' counterpart of the unity of the world, but never the unity itself. Whoever judges in this way has never made it clear to himself what a percept without the concept really is.
在朴素的人类意识中，根深蒂固的见解是：思维是抽象的，没有任何具体内容，至多能提供世界统一性的一个"观念性"映像，而非这统一性本身。如此判断的人，从未真正想清楚：没有概念的感知究竟是什么。
Let us see what this world of percepts is like: a mere juxtaposition in space, a mere succession in time, a mass of unconnected details - that is how it appears. None of the things which come and go on the stage of perception has any direct connection, that can be perceived, with any other. The world is thus a multiplicity of objects of equal value. None plays any greater part in the whole machinery of the world than any other.
且看这感知的世界：它呈现为空间中的单纯并列与时间中的单纯相继，一堆毫无关联的个别事物的集合。在感知舞台上出现又消逝的那些事物，彼此之间在可感知的层面上没有任何直接关联。世界在这里是一个由等价对象构成的杂多，在世界的运转中，没有哪个比另一个起着更大的作用。
If it is to become clear to us that this or that fact has greater significance than another, we must consult our thinking. (...) This activity of thinking is one full of content.
若要明白某一事实比另一事实具有更大的意义，我们必须求诸我们的思维。（……）思维的这一活动是富有内容的。
In contrast to the content of the percept which is given to us from without, the content of thinking appears inwardly. The form in which this first makes its appearance we will call intuition. Intuition is for thinking what observation is for the percept.
与从外部给予我们的感知内容相反，思想内容出现于内部。它最初呈现的形式，我们称之为直觉。它对于思维，正如观察对于感知一样。
An observed object of the world remains unintelligible to us until we have within ourselves the corresponding intuition which adds that part of reality which is lacking in the percept. To anyone who is incapable of finding intuitions corresponding to the things, the full reality remains inaccessible.
我们与所观察到的世界事物保持陌生，直到我们内心拥有相应的直觉——那个补充感知中所缺失的那部分现实的直觉。没有能力找到与事物相应之直觉的人，完整的现实对他始终是封闭的。
To explain a thing, to make it intelligible, means nothing else than to place it into the context from which it has been separated out due the peculiar character of our organisation as already described.
解释一个事物、使之可以理解，不过意味着：将它重新置入那个联系之中——它正是被我们上述所描述的有机组织的安排从中撕离出来的。
A thing cut off from the world-whole does not exist. All isolating has only subjective validity for our organisation.
不存在与世界整体相割裂的事物。一切分离都只具有对我们有机组织而言的主观效力。
What appears to us in observation as separate parts becomes combined, bit by bit, through the coherent, unified world of our intuitions. By thinking we fit together again into one whole all that we have taken apart through perceiving.
在观察中向我们呈现的那些个别事物，通过我们直觉的连贯统一世界一环一环地相互联结；我们通过思维将一切重新合而为一——那些我们通过感知而分离的东西。
The enigmatic character of an object consists in its separateness. But this separation is of our own making and can, within the world of concepts, be overcome again.
一个对象的神秘性在于它的孤立存在。然而这是由我们所引发的，在概念世界之内，也可以被再次消解。
Except through thinking and perceiving nothing is given to us directly.
除通过思维与感知之外，没有任何东西直接给予我们。
In each of these fields I gather new percepts, but the connecting medium which weaves through all these spatially and temporally separated percepts is thinking.
在每一个这样的领域中，我都获得新的感知；但那个作为纽带贯穿所有这些在空间和时间上彼此分散的感知的，是思维。
What then is a percept? The question, asked in this general way, makes no sense. A percept emerges always as something perfectly definite, as a concrete content. This content is directly given and is completely contained in what is given.
那么，感知究竟是什么？这个问题若作一般性的提问，是荒谬的。感知总是以完全确定的、具体内容的形式出现。这一内容是直接给予的，并穷尽于所给予的东西之中。
The question concerning the 'what' of a percept can, therefore, only refer to the conceptual intuition that corresponds to this percept.
因此，对于感知的"是什么"这一问题，只能指向与之相应的概念性直觉。
To form a link between something subjective and something objective is impossible for any process that is 'real' in the naive sense, that is, one that can be perceived; it is possible only for thinking.
在主观与客观之间建立纽带，不属于任何朴素意义上的实在过程——即可感知的事件——的职能，而唯独属于思维。
Therefore what appears for our perception to be external to the percept of myself as subject is for us 'objective'.
因此，对我们而言，客观的是那在感知中呈现为位于感知主体之外的东西。
The mental picture is, therefore, a subjective percept, in contrast with the objective percept which occurs when the object is present in the field of perception.
因此，表象是一种主观感知，与对象出现在感知视域中时的客观感知相对。
Confusing the subjective percept with the objective percept leads to the misconception contained in idealism - that the world is my mental picture.
将那种主观感知与这种客观感知混为一谈，导致了唯心论的误解："世界是我的表象。"
The thought formation is such that it requires something more than mere theoretical refutation. We have to live through it in order to understand the aberration into which it leads us and thence to find the way out. (...) One needs to arrive at just that insight which will enable one to refute oneself with respect to these first reflections.
这种思想构型，仅凭纯粹的理论反驳，并未完成一切必要之事。人必须亲历它，才能从对它所引向的那种迷途的洞见中找到出路。（……）人必须获得这样的洞见：如何在这种最初的反思中，自己反驳了自己。
But we do not arrive at anything else which we could regard as truth if we merely abandon the naive point of view while unconsciously retaining the type of thought which it implies.
然而，如果人只是离开朴素的立场，却在不自知的情况下保留了它所强加的那种思维方式，便无法抵达任何可以被视为真理的别的东西。
One only avoids the confusion into which one falls through the critical attitude based on this naive standpoint, if one notices that, inside everything we can experience by means of perceiving, be it within ourselves or in the outside world, there is something which cannot suffer the fate of having a mental picture interpose itself between the process and the person observing it. This something is thinking.
人唯有在察觉到以下事实时，才能摆脱对这一立场进行批判反思所带来的混乱：在人能够于内心与外部世界中感知性地体验到的一切之中，存在着某种根本不会陷入那种困境的东西——那种"表象楔入事件与观察者之间"的困境。这种东西，就是思维。
With regard to thinking, we can maintain the point of view of naive realism.
面对思维，人可以停留在朴素的实在立场上。
When we realise this, we open the way to the further insight that in thinking and through thinking man must recognise the very thing to which he has apparently blinded himself by having to interpose his life of mental pictures between the world and himself.
一旦意识到这一点，他便向另一种洞见开启了通道：必须在思维之中并通过思维来认识那个人似乎使自己对之盲目的东西——因为他不得不将表象的生活楔入世界与自身之间。
However, the author believes himself to have shown in this very discussion that the validity of this 'naive realism' for thinking results inevitably from an unprejudiced observation of thinking; and that naive realism, in so far as it is invalid for other things, is overcome through the recognition of the true nature of thinking.
一旦意识到这一点，他便向另一种洞见开启了通道：必须在思维之中并通过思维来认识那个人似乎使自己对之盲目的东西——因为他不得不将表象的生活楔入世界与自身之间。
