Chapter VIII
The Factors of Life
第八章
生命要素
The world faces man as a multiplicity, as a mass of separate details. One of these separate things, one entity among others, is man himself.
世界以多样性的面目呈现于人之前——作为个别存在之总和。其中一个个别存在，一个存在者中的存在者，便是人自身。
This form in which the world appears we simply call the given, and inasmuch as we do not produce it by conscious activity, but just find it, we call it percept.
我们将世界的这一形态径直称之为"给定的"；而就我们并非通过有意识的活动将其展开、而是将其发现于眼前这一意义而言，则称之为感知。
This percept of self would remain merely one among many other percepts, if something did not arise from the midst of this percept of self which proves capable of connecting all percepts with one another and, therefore, the sum of all other percepts with the percept of one's own self.
这种自我感知，若非从其核心涌现出某种东西——某种足以将诸感知、从而也将所有其他感知的总和与自我感知相联结的东西——便只会作为众多感知中的一个感知而静静停驻于那里。
This something which emerges is no longer merely percept; neither is it, like percepts, simply given. It is produced by our activity. To begin with, it appears to be bound up with what we perceive as our own self. In its inner significance, however, it transcends the self.
这涌现出来的某物，已不再是单纯的感知；它也不像感知那样被简单地发现于眼前。它乃是通过活动被产生出来的。它首先显现为与我们所感知的自我紧密相连；然而就其内在意义而言，它却超越了自我的界限。
It adds conceptual definitions to the single percepts. These conceptual elements relate to each other and form a whole. It defines conceptually what we gain through self-perception in the same way as it defines all other perceptions, and places it as subject, or 'I', over against the objects.
它为各个别感知附加上观念性的规定，而这些规定彼此相关联，根植于一个整体之中。它以同样的观念方式规定着通过自我感知所获得的内容，将其作为主体或"自我"与客体相对立。
This something is thinking, and the conceptual elements are the concepts and ideas.
这某物便是思维，而那些观念性的规定便是概念与理念。
Thinking, therefore, first reveals itself in the percept of the self. But it is not merely subjective, for the self characterises itself as subject only with the help of thinking.
因此，思维首先显现于自我的感知之中；但它并非仅仅是主观的——因为自我正是借助思维才将自身标示为主体的。
This relationship in thought of the self to itself is what, in life, determines our personality. Through it we lead an existence based purely in ideas. Through it we feel ourselves to be thinking beings.
这种思维性的自我关联，是我们人格的一种生命规定。通过它，我们过着一种纯粹观念性的存在。通过它，我们感知到自身是能思维的存在者。
As we have already seen, we do not relate
percepts to ourselves only through concepts, but also through our feelings. Therefore we are not beings with solely a conceptual content to our existence.
如我们所见，我们不仅通过概念以观念方式将感知关联于自身，还通过情感来完成这一关联。因此，我们并非仅具有概念性生命内容的存在者。
To begin with, feeling is exactly the same, on the subjective side, as the percept is on the objective side. From the basic principle of naive realism - that everything that can be perceived is real - it follows that it is feeling which confirms the reality of one's own personality.
情感在主观一侧，起初与感知在客观一侧恰好相同。依据素朴实在论的原则——凡能被感知的皆为实在——情感因此成为个人人格之实在性的担保。
Monism, however, as here understood, must grant the same addition to feeling that it considers necessary for percepts, if these are to stand before us as full reality. Thus, for monism, feeling is an incomplete reality, which, in the form in which it first appears to us, does not yet contain its second factor, the concept or idea.
然而，此处所论的一元论，必须赋予情感以同样的补充——亦即它认为感知若要呈现为完整的现实所必需的那种补充。对这种一元论而言，情感是一种不完整的实在：在其最初被给予我们的形态中，它尚未包含其第二个因素——概念或理念。
This is why, in life, feelings, like percepts, always appear prior to knowledge.
因此，在生活中，情感与感知一样，总是先于认识而出现。
At first, we have merely a feeling of existence; and it is only in the course of our gradual development that we attain to the point at which the concept of self emerges from within our dimly felt existence. However, what for us appears only later, is from the first indissolubly bound up with our feeling.
我们首先将自身感受为存在着的；而在逐渐发展的过程中，我们才艰难地抵达这样一个节点：在那朦胧感受到的自身存在中，自我的概念对我们豁然而显。然而，那对我们而言后来才显现的东西，原本却与情感不可分割地联系在一起。
Since a feeling is something entirely individual, something equivalent to a percept, the philosopher of Feeling is making a universal principle out of something that has significance only within his own personality. He attempts to permeate the whole world with his own self. What the monist, in the sense we have described, strives to grasp through concepts, the philosopher of Feeling tries to attain through feelings, and he regards this kind of connection with the objects as the more direct.
由于情感是某种完全个体性的东西，某种与感知相当的东西，情感哲学家便将一个仅在其个人人格之内才具有意义的原则，提升为宇宙原则。他试图以自身的自我去穿透整个世界。此处所论的一元论所力求以概念来把握的，情感哲学家则试图以情感来达到，并将他与客体的这种共在视为更为直接的。
The tendency just described, the philosophy of Feeling, is often called mysticism. The error in a mystical outlook based upon mere feeling is that it wants to experience directly what it ought to gain through knowledge; that it wants to raise feeling, which is individual, into a universal principle.
这里所描述的这一方向——情感哲学——通常被称为神秘主义。一种仅建立在情感之上的神秘世界观的错误在于：它想要体验那应当被认识的东西，想要将个体性的情感培育为普遍性的东西。
Feeling is a purely individual affair; it is the relation of the external world to ourself as subject, in so far as this relation finds expression in a merely subjective experience.
情感是一种纯粹个体性的行为，是外部世界与我们主体的关联——就这种关联在一种纯粹主观的体验中找到其表达而言。
The I, through its thinking, shares the life of the world in general. In this manner, in a purely ideal way (that is, conceptually), it relates the percepts to itself, and itself to the percepts. In feeling, it has direct experience of a relation of the objects to itself as subject. In the will, the case is reversed. In willing, we are concerned once more with a percept, namely, that of the individual relation of our self to what is objective.
自我通过思维参与普遍的世界生命；通过思维，它以纯粹观念性（概念性）的方式将感知关联于自身，将自身关联于感知。在情感中，它体验着客体与其主体的关联；在意志中，情形则恰好相反。在意愿中，我们同样面对一种感知，即自我与客观事物之个体性关联的感知。
Whatever there is in willing that is not a purely conceptual element, is just as much mere object of perception as is any object in the external world.
意志中凡非纯粹观念性因素的部分，同样仅仅是感知的对象，正如外部世界中任何事物的情形一样。
The difficulty of grasping the essential nature of thinking by observation lies in this, that it has all too easily eluded the introspecting soul by the time the soul tries to bring it into the focus of attention. Nothing then remains to be inspected but the lifeless abstraction, the corpse of the living thinking.
以观察的方式把握思维之本质的困难在于：当观察的心灵试图将其纳入注意力的方向时，这一本质往往早已从其手中溜走。留给它的，只是死寂的抽象——活生生的思维的遗骸。
But if we once succeed in really finding life in thinking, we shall know that swimming in mere feelings, or being intuitively aware of the will element, cannot even be compared with the inner wealth and the self-sustaining yet ever moving experience of this life of thinking, let alone be ranked above it.
然而，凡能真正拥有思维之生命的人，便会领悟：在这一生命中，其内在的丰盈与那安然自持却又在自身之内涌动的体验，是单纯的情感流动或对意志要素的直观所无从比拟的，更遑论将后者凌驾于前者之上。
No other activity of the human soul is so easily misunderstood as thinking.
没有任何其他的人类心灵活动，会像思维那样容易遭到误识。
Will and feeling still fill the soul with warmth even when we live through the original event again in retrospect. Thinking all too readily leaves us cold in recollection; it is as if the life of the soul had dried out. Yet this is really nothing but the strongly marked shadow of its real nature - warm, luminous, and deeply immersed in the phenomena of the world.
意志与情感，即便在对其原初状态的追体验中，仍能温暖人类的灵魂。而思维在这种追体验中却极容易令人感到冷漠；它似乎使灵魂生活趋于干涸。然而，这恰恰只是其那光明交织、温暖地沉潜入世界现象之现实的强烈凸显的阴影。
This immersion is brought about by a power flowing through the activity of thinking itself - the power of love in its spiritual form.
这种沉潜，以一种在思维活动本身之中川流不息的力量发生着——这种力量，乃是精神意义上的爱之力。
If we turn towards thinking in its essence, we find in it both feeling and will, and these in the depths of their reality; if we turn away from thinking towards 'mere' feeling and will, we lose from these their true reality
因为，凡转向本质性思维的人，在其中既能找到情感也能找到意志——后者更是在其现实性的深处；而凡背离思维、只转向"单纯的"情感与意志的人，则从这些之中失落了真实的现实。
