Chapter IX/2
The Idea of Freedom
第九章/2
自由的理念
In any particular act of will we must take into account the motive and the underlying driving force. The motive has the character of a concept or a mental picture; the underlying driving force is the will element arising directly from the human organisation.
对于个别的意志行为，需考量的是：动机与驱动力。动机是概念性或表象性的因素；驱动力则是直接植根于人类有机组织中的意愿因素。
The conceptual factor, or motive, is the momentary determining factor of the will; the driving force is the permanent determining factor of the individual.
概念性因素即动机，是意愿的即时决定根据；驱动力则是个体持久的决定根据。
The manner in which concept and mental picture work upon a person's characterological disposition, gives a definite moral or ethical stamp to that person's life.
概念与表象作用于人的性格素质的方式，赋予其生命以特定的道德或伦理印记。
The characterological disposition is formed by the more or less permanent content of our individual life, namely by the content of our mental pictures and feelings.
性格素质由我们主体多少带有持久性的生命内容所塑造，亦即由我们的表象内容与情感内容所塑造。
The immediately present mental picture or concept, which becomes the motive, determines the aim or the purpose of my will; my characterological disposition leads me to direct my activity towards this aim.
那成为动机的、当下直接呈现的表象或概念，规定着我意愿的目标与目的；我的性格素质则决定着我将自己的活动指向这一目标。
We must therefore distinguish (1) the possible subjective dispositions which are capable of turning certain mental pictures and concepts into motives, and (2) the possible mental pictures and concepts which are in a position to influence my characterological disposition so that an act of will results. For our moral life the former represent the underlying driving force, and the latter constitute its aims.
因此我们必须区分：一、可能的主观素质——适于将特定表象和概念转化为动机的素质；二、可能的表象和概念——能够影响我的性格素质使意愿得以产生的表象和概念。前者构成道德的驱动力，后者构成道德的目标。
The first level of individual life is that of perceiving, more particularly perceiving through the senses. This is the region of our individual life in which perceiving translates itself directly into willing, without the intervention of either a feeling or a concept. The driving force here involved is simply called instinct.
个体生命的第一个层次是感知，即感官的感知。我们在此处于个体生命中那样一个领域：感知在其中不经情感或概念的介入，直接转化为意愿。在这里起作用的人类驱动力，径直被称为本能冲动。
The main characteristic of instinctive life is the immediacy with which the single percept triggers the act of will.
冲动生命的特征在于：个别感知触发意愿的那种直接性。
This kind of determination of the will, which belongs originally only to the life of the lower senses, may however become extended also to the percepts of the higher senses. (...) The driving force of such action is called tact or moral taste.
这种规定意愿的方式，原本仅属于较低层次的感官生命，也可延伸到较高感官的感知。……这种行为的驱动力被称为格调或道德趣味。
The second level of human life is feeling. Definite feelings accompany the percepts of the external world. These feelings may become the driving force of an action. (...) Such feelings, for example, are shame, pride, sense of honour, humility, remorse, pity, revenge, gratitude, piety, loyalty, love, and duty.
人类生命的第二个领域是情感。外部世界的感知与特定的情感相联结，这些情感可以成为行为的驱动力。……此类情感例如：羞耻感、骄傲、荣誉感、谦逊、悔恨、同情、复仇感与感恩感、虔敬、忠诚、爱与责任感。
The third level of life amounts to thinking and forming mental pictures. A mental picture or a concept may become the motive of an action through mere reflection. (...) The driving force in the will, in this case, we can call practical experience. Practical experience merges gradually into true tactful behaviour.
生命的第三个层次最终是思维与表象。通过单纯的思考，一个表象或概念便可成为行为的动机。……我们可以将这里所指的意愿驱动力称为实践经验。实践经验逐渐过渡为纯粹合乎格调的行为。
The highest level of individual life is that of conceptual thinking without regard to any definite perceptual content. We determine the content of a concept through pure intuition from out of the ideal sphere. Such a concept contains, at first, no reference to any specific percepts.
个体生命的最高层次是不顾及特定感知内容的概念性思维。我们从观念领域出发，通过纯粹直觉来规定一个概念的内容。这样的概念起初不含对特定感知的任何关联。
But if we act under the influence of intuitions, the driving force of our action is pure thinking. As it is the custom in philosophy to call the faculty of pure thinking 'reason', we may well be justified in giving the name of practical reason to the moral driving force characteristic of this level of life.
当我们在直觉的影响下行动时，我们行为的驱动力便是纯粹思维。由于哲学上习惯将纯粹的思维能力称为理性，故将这一层次上的道德驱动力称为实践理性，亦属恰当。
Since a real act of will results only when a momentary impulse to action, in the form of a concept or mental picture, acts on the characterological disposition, such an impulse then becomes the motive of the will.
只有当一个以概念或表象形式出现的即时行为冲动作用于性格素质时，才会产生真实的意志行为。这样的冲动便成为意愿的动机。
The mental picture of a future feeling, but not the feeling itself, can act on my characterological disposition. For the feeling itself does not yet exist in the moment of action; it has first to be produced by the action.
对未来情感的表象，而非情感本身，才能作用于我的性格素质。因为情感本身在行动的当下尚未存在，而是要通过行动才能被带来。
The mental picture of one's own or another's welfare is, however, rightly regarded as a motive of the will. The principle of producing the greatest quantity of pleasure for oneself through one's action, that is, of attaining individual happiness, is called egoism.
对自身或他人福祉的表象，被有充分理由地视为意愿的动机。通过自己的行为带来最大总量的个人快乐——亦即实现个体幸福——这一原则被称为利己主义。
The special content of the egoistical principles of morality will depend on the mental pictures which we form of what constitutes our own, or others', happiness.
利己主义伦理原则的具体内容，将取决于人对自身或他人幸福所形成的表象。
The purely conceptual content of an action is to be regarded as yet another kind of motive. This content refers not to the particular action only, as with the mental picture of one's own pleasures, but to the derivation of an action from a system of moral principles. These moral principles, in the form of abstract concepts, may regulate the individual's moral life without his worrying himself about the origin of the concepts.
进而，一个行为纯粹概念性的内容也应被视为一种动机。这种内容不像对个人快乐的表象那样仅关乎单个行为，而是关乎从一套道德原则体系中为行为奠定根据。这些道德原则可以抽象概念的形式规范道德生活，无需个人追问这些概念的来源。
In that case, we simply feel that submitting to a moral concept in the form of a commandment overshadowing our actions, is a moral necessity. The establishment of this necessity we leave to those who demand moral subjection from us, that is, to the moral authority that we acknowledge (the head of the family, the state, social custom, the authority of the church, divine revelation).
我们那时只是将对悬于行为之上的道德概念的服从感受为道德必然性。我们将这一必然性的根据留给那要求道德服从的力量，亦即我们所承认的道德权威（家长、国家、社会习俗、教会权威、神圣启示）。
It is a special kind of these moral principles when the commandment is made known to us not through an external authority but through our own inner life (moral autonomy). In this case we hear the voice to which we have to submit ourselves, in our own souls. This voice expresses itself as conscience.
这类道德原则有一种特殊形式：戒命不通过外在权威向我们显现，而是通过我们自己的内心（道德自律）。我们此时听到的是内心深处那必须服从的声音。这声音的表达便是良知。
It is a moral advance when a man no longer simply accepts the commands of an outer or inner authority as the motive of his action, but tries to understand the reason why a particular maxim of behaviour should act as a motive in him. This is the advance from morality based on authority to action out of moral insight.
当一个人不是简单地将外在或内在权威的戒命作为行为动机，而是力求洞察某一行为准则为何应在其中作为动机发挥作用的根据时，这便代表着道德上的进步。这种进步，是从权威性道德走向出于道德洞见而行动的进步。
At this level of morality a man will try to find out the requirements of the moral life and will let his actions be determined by the knowledge of them. Such requirements are (1) the greatest possible good of mankind purely for its own sake; (2) the progress of civilisation, or the moral evolution of mankind towards ever greater perfection; (3) the realisation of individual moral aims grasped by pure intuition.
在这一道德层次上，人将去寻求道德生命的需求，并让对这些需求的认识来决定其行为。这样的需求例如：一、纯粹为了全体人类福祉本身而追求最大可能的全人类福祉；二、文化进步或人类道德发展向着愈益完善的方向前进；三、实现纯粹通过直觉所把握的个体性道德目标。
The principle of the progress of civilization, like that of the general good, is based on a mental picture, that is, on the way we relate the content of our moral ideas to particular experiences (percepts). The highest conceivable moral principle, however, is one that from the start contains no such reference to particular experiences, but springs from the source of pure intuition and only later seeks any reference to percepts, that is, to life.
无论是全体福祉的准则还是文化进步的准则，都建立在表象之上，亦即建立在人们赋予道德理念之内容与特定体验（感知）之关系上。然而，可以设想的最高道德原则是这样一种原则：它从一开始不包含这种关联，而是从纯粹直觉的源泉中涌现，此后才寻求与感知（与生活）的关联。
But there is a still higher way which does not start from one and the same particular moral aim in each case, but sees a certain value in all moral principles and always asks whether in the given case this or that principle is the more important.
然而还存在着更高的东西：它在具体情形中不从某个特定的单一道德目标出发，而是赋予所有道德准则以某种价值，并在具体情况下始终追问：在此究竟是这一个道德原则还是那一个更为重要。
But if no other ground for decision claims more than second place, then conceptual intuition itself comes first and foremost into consideration. All other motives now give way, and the idea behind an action alone becomes its motive.
然而，当所有其他决定根据退居次位时，首先发挥作用的便是概念性直觉本身。由此，其他动机便从主导地位退下，只有行为的理念内容作为其动机而起作用。
Among the levels of characterological disposition, we have singled out as the highest the one that works as pure thinking or practical reason. Among the motives, we have just singled out conceptual intuition as the highest. On closer inspection it will at once be seen that at this level of morality driving force and motive coincide; that is, neither a predetermined characterological disposition nor the external authority of an accepted moral principle influences our conduct.
在性格素质的各个层次中，我们将那以纯粹思维、以实践理性起作用的层次称为最高层次。在各动机中，我们现在将概念性直觉称为最高动机。经过更仔细的考察便立刻可以发现：在这一道德层次上，驱动力与动机合而为一——亦即，既无预先确定的性格素质，也无外在的、被规范性接受的道德原则作用于我们的行为。
The action is therefore neither necessitated by following certain rules, nor is it one which we are bound to perform in response to an external impulse, but it is an action determined purely and simply by its own ideal content.
因此，这样的行为既不是按照某些规则执行的模板式行为，也不是人在外部冲动下机械完成的行为，而是一种纯粹由其理念内容所决定的行为。
