Chapter 9.3 – Philosophy of Freedom

Chapter IX/3

The Idea of Freedom

第九章/3

自由的理念

Kant's principle of morality, 'act so that the basis of your action may be valid for all men' is the exact opposite of ours. His principle amounts to a death blow for all individual impulses of action. The way everyone else might act cannot be decisive for me, but rather what is to be done by me in each individual situation.

这一道德原则的正反面是康德式的：行动时应使你行为的准则能对所有人普遍适用。这一命题是一切个体性行为冲动的扼杀者。对我而言，具有决定意义的不是所有人将会如何行动，而是在这个具体情形中我该做什么。

Human beings vary greatly in their capacity for intuition. In one, ideas just bubble up; another acquires them with much labour. The situations in which people live and which provide the scenes of their actions are no less varied. The conduct of a person will therefore depend on the manner in which their faculty of intuition works in a given situation.

人在直觉能力上各有不同。对一些人，理念汩汩涌来；对另一些人，则需费力求取。人们所处的生活情境——构成其行为舞台的情境——也同样千差万别。一个人如何行动，因此将取决于其直觉能力面对特定情境时的运作方式。

The sum of ideas which are effective in us, the concrete content of our intuitions, constitutes what is individual in each of us, notwithstanding the universality of the world of ideas. In so far as this intuitive content applies to action, it constitutes the moral content of the individual.

在我们之中起作用的理念之总和——我们直觉的实际内容——构成了那在理念世界的一切普遍性中在每个人身上独具个体特色的东西。这一直觉内容就其指向行为而言，便是个体的道德内涵。

To let this content express itself in life is both the highest moral driving force and the highest motive a person can have. Such a person sees that in this content all other moral principles are ultimately united. We may call this point of view ethical individualism.

让这一内涵得以充分展现，是那洞见到所有其他道德原则最终都汇聚于这一内涵中的人的最高道德驱动力，同时也是其最高动机。这一立场可称之为伦理个体主义。

The decisive factor of an intuitively determined action in any concrete instance is the discovery of the corresponding purely individual intuition. At this level of morality one can only speak of general concepts of morality (norms, laws) in so far as these result from the generalisation of the individual impulses.

在具体情形中，直觉性地规定的行为，其决定性因素在于找到相应的、完全个体性的直觉。在这一道德层次上，普遍性的道德概念（规范、法则）只能在如下意义上被谈及：它们是从个体性冲动的普遍化中产生出来的。

If a person acts only because they accept certain ethical norms, their action is the outcome of the principles which comprise their moral code. They are merely following orders. They are a superior automaton. Drop some stimulus to action into their mind, and at once the clockwork of their moral principles will set itself in motion and run its prescribed course, resulting in an action which may be Christian, or humane, or seemingly unselfish, or calculated to promote the progress of civilisation.

只是因为承认特定道德规范而行动的人，其行为不过是其道德准则中所列原则的产物。他只是一个执行者，是一台高级自动机。将一个行为契机投入其意识，道德原则的齿轮便立即运转，以合乎规律的方式运行，以完成一个基督式的、人道主义的、在他看来无私的行为，或一个推动文化历史进步的行为。

I act, at this level of morality, not because I acknowledge an overlord, or an external authority, or a so-called inner voice; I acknowledge no external principle for my action, because I have found in myself the ground for my action, namely, my love of the action.

在这一道德层次上，我行动，不是因为我承认了凌驾于我之上的主宰、外在权威或所谓的内心声音。我不承认行为的任何外在原则，因为我在自身之内找到了行为的根据——对行为的爱。

I do not work out intellectually whether my action is good or bad; I carry it out because I love it. My action will be 'good' if my intuition, steeped in love, finds its right place within the world continuum that can be experienced intuitively; it will be 'bad' if this is not the case.

我不以理智判断我的行为是善是恶；我实施它，因为我爱它。当我那沉浸于爱中的直觉以正确的方式置身于须以直觉体验的宇宙关联之中时，它便是"善的"；若非如此，则是"恶的"。

No general usage, no common custom, no maxim applying to all men, no moral standard is my immediate guide, but my love for the deed. I feel no compulsion, neither the compulsion of nature which guides me by my instincts, nor the compulsion of the moral commandments, but I simply want to carry out what lies within me.

在直接意义上引导我的，不是普遍惯例、普遍习俗、普遍人类准则或道德规范，而是我对行动的爱。我感受不到任何强制——既无自然的强制（它在冲动中引导我），也无道德戒命的强制——我只是想去实现那存于我心中的东西。

On the path towards this goal norms play their rightful part. The goal consists of the realisation of moral aims grasped by pure intuition. The human being attains such aims to the extent that they are able to raise themselves to the intuitive world of ideas.

在通往这一目标的路途中，规范扮演着其正当的角色。这一目标在于实现纯粹以直觉把握的道德目的。人在多大程度上具备将自身提升至世界的直觉性理念内容的能力，便在多大程度上达到这样的目标。

In any particular act of will such moral aims will generally have other elements mixed in with them, either as driving force or as motive. Nevertheless intuition may still be wholly or partly the determining factor in the human will.

在个别的意愿中，通常会有其他东西作为驱动力或动机混入这样的目标之中。但直觉性的东西在人类意愿中仍可以是决定性的或共同决定性的。

What should be done, is done; one gives over the stage upon which obligation becomes deed; an action is only one's own when it arises from within oneself. Only here can the impulse be wholly individual. And, in truth, only an act of will that springs from intuition can be a truly individual one.

人做其应当做的；人提供"应当"转化为"行动"的舞台；属于自己的行为，是人作为己出而让其从自身涌现的东西。那里的冲动只能是完全个体性的。而实际上，只有从直觉中涌现的意志行为才能是个体性的。

But the blind instinct that drives a human being to crime does not spring from intuition, and does not belong to what is individual in them, but rather to what is most general, to what is equally present in all individuals. From out of this condition human beings evolve by means of what is individual in them.

然而，那驱人走向罪行的盲目冲动，并非源于直觉性的东西，也不属于人的个体性，而是属于人身上最普遍的东西——那在所有个体中同等起作用的东西，人正是通过其个体性从中挣脱出来的。

My instincts, urges and passions establish no more than that I belong to the general human species; it is the fact that something from the world of ideas comes to expression in a particular way within these urges, passions and feelings that establishes my individuality.

我的冲动、本能、激情在我身上所奠定的，不过是我属于人类这一普遍种类这一事实；而某种理念性的东西以一种特殊方式在这些冲动、激情与情感中展现自身，这一情况才奠定了我的个体性。

Only a being other than myself could distinguish me from others by the difference in my animal nature; through my thinking, that is, by actively grasping what expresses itself within me as idea, I distinguish myself from others.

依据我动物性本质的差异，只有一个外在于我的存在才能将我与他人区分开来；而通过我的思维——亦即通过对那在我的有机组织中以理念方式展现自身的东西的能动把握——我将自己与他人区别开来。

An action is felt to be free in so far as the reasons for it spring from the ideal part of my individual being; every other part of an action, irrespective of whether it is carried out under the compulsion of nature or under the obligation of a moral standard, is experienced as unfree.

一个行为，就其根据源于我个体本质的理念部分而言，被感受为自由的；行为中任何其他部分——无论是出于自然的强制还是出于道德规范的迫使——都被感受为不自由的。

The mere concept of duty excludes freedom because it does not acknowledge the individual element but demands that this be subject to a general norm. Freedom of action is conceivable only from the standpoint of ethical individualism.

单纯的义务概念排斥自由，因为它不承认个体性，而是要求个体性服从于普遍规范。行为的自由只有从伦理个体主义的立场出发才是可设想的。